

COMPREHENSIVE PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS

Pre-deployment Training

Reinforcement Training Package
Military Contingents in UN
Peacekeeping Operations

Scenario Based Exercise

COMPREHENSIVE PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS

Comprehensive
Reinforcement Training Package for Military
Contingents in UN Peacekeeping
Operations

Scenario Based Exercise

Tactical Planning

Entebbe Version - May 2017



United Nations

Contents

1a UNSCR 1544 UNAC

1b Statement UNSC

2a Country Study

2b Situation in Carana

2c Situation of Mission Partners

2d Kalari Peace Agreement

3a Planning Directive

3a.i ROE

3b Planning Matrix

3c Mission CONOP

3c.i Mission CONOP Annex

3d Military CONOP

3e OPORD

3f.i UNAC Deployment Map Transition

3f.ii Deployment Map AOR KazBatt

3f.ii Deployment Map Sector 2c

4a Sector 2 HQ WARNO - Requirement

DRAFT



Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL
S/RES/2300 (20XX)
22 M+3 20XX

RESOLUTION 1544 (20XX)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 8000th meeting on 22 M+3 20XX

The Security Council,

Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of Carana.,

Expressing its utmost concerns at the dire consequences of the prolonged conflict for the civilian population throughout Carana, in particular the increase in the number of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs).

Deploing all violations of human rights, particularly atrocities against the civilian populations, including acts of sexual violence, in Carana, and recalling its resolutions 1325 (2000), 1820 (2008), 1888 (2009) and 1889 (2009) on women, peace and security, its resolutions 1612 (2005) and 1882 (2009) on children and armed conflict and its resolution 1674 (2006) and 1894 (2009) on the protection of civilians in armed conflicts,

Commending the efforts of, and reiterating its full support for, the Continent Regional Coalition, the United Nations Secretary-General, and the leaders of the region to promote peace and stability in Carana,

Welcoming the swift action by the French forces, at the request of the authorities of Carana, to assist the restoration of Carana's integrity,

Stressing the need to restore democratic governance and constitutional order, including through the holding of free, fair, transparent and inclusive elections,

Deploing all violations of human rights, particularly against the civilian population, and urging the new Carana Government of National Reconciliation to take all necessary measures to put an end to impunity and to ensure the continued promotion and protection of human rights,

Remaining seriously concerned over the significant humanitarian crisis in the region and over the insecurity that hinders humanitarian access, exacerbated by the presence of landmines as well as the continued proliferation of weapons,

Emphasizing the need for all parties to safeguard the welfare and security of humanitarian workers and United Nations personnel in accordance with applicable rules and principles of international law,

Mindful of the need for accountability for violations of international humanitarian law and urging the Carana Government of National Reconciliation to ensure that the protection of human rights and the establishment of a state based on the rule of law and of an independent judiciary are among its highest priorities,

Taking note of the Peace Agreement reached by some of the key parties on 31 May xxxx and *urging* all parties to work without delay towards a broad political consensus on the nature and duration of the political transition,

Welcoming the human rights commitments contained in that Agreement,

Stressing the urgent need for substantial humanitarian assistance to the Carana population,

Reaffirming that the primary responsibility for implementing the Kalari Peace Agreement and the ceasefire agreement rests with the parties, and urging the parties to move forward with implementation of these agreements immediately in order to ensure the peaceful formation of a new Government of National Reconciliation.

Taking note of the listing of Combattants Indépendants du Sud Carana (CISC) and *reiterating its readiness* to sanction further individuals, groups, undertakings and entities in accordance with the established listing criteria,

Noting that lasting stability in Carana will depend on peace in the sub-region, and emphasising the importance of cooperation among the countries of the sub-region to this end, as well as the need for coordination of United Nations efforts to contribute to the consolidation of peace and security in the sub-region,

Expressing its continued concern over the serious threats posed by transnational crime in the region, and its increasing links, in some cases, with terrorism and *strongly condemning* the incidents of kidnapping and hostage-taking with the aim of raising funds or gaining political concessions,

Determining that the situation in Carana continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region, to stability in the 8th Continent sub-region, and to the peace process for Carana,

Commending the Continent Regional Coalition, as well as the Secretary-General, for their intensive efforts to solve the crisis in Carana, and *encourages* to

maintain coordination in support of the stabilization of the situation in Carana, including the national political dialogue and electoral process,

Welcoming the deployment of the CRCAC to assist in overseeing and verifying the ceasefire,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. *Welcomes* the measures to restore order and national unity in Carana, including the adoption of the Kalari Peace Agreement;
2. *Requests* the Secretary-General, in close coordination with the CRC, to support all dimensions of the Kalari Peace Agreement, with a view to its swift implementation;
3. *Urges* the Government of National Reconciliation in Carana to hold free, fair, transparent and inclusive elections as soon as technically possible, stresses the importance of ensuring an environment conducive to the holding of elections;
4. *Decides* to establish the United Nations Assistance Mission to Carana (UNAC), *further decides* that the authority be transferred from CRCAC to UNAC on 1 M + 3 2016 at which point UNAC shall commence the implementation of its mandate as defined in paragraph 7 below, for an initial period of 12 months and *requests* the Secretary-General to include in UNAC, in close coordination with CRC, CRCAC military personnel appropriate to United Nations standards;
5. *Requests* the Secretary-General to appoint expeditiously a Special Representative for Carana to direct the operations of UNAC and coordinate all United Nations activities in Carana;
6. *Decides* that UNAC will consist of up to 6,800 United Nations military personnel, including up to 200 military observers and 160 staff officers, up to 1250 police personnel, including formed police units, and up to 200 corrections officers, to assist in the maintenance of law and order throughout Carana, and the appropriate civilian component;
7. *Decides* that UNAC shall have the following mandate:

Support for the implementation of the Kalari Peace Agreement:

- (a) To assist the Government of National Reconciliation of Carana to implement swiftly the provisions of the Kalari Peace Agreement towards the restoration of constitutional order, democratic governance and national unity in Carana;

- (b) To exercise good offices, confidence-building and facilitation at the national and local levels, in order to anticipate, prevent, mitigate and resolve conflict;
- (c) To observe and monitor the implementation of the peace agreement and investigate violations of the ceasefire;
- (d) To establish and maintain continuous liaison with the field headquarters of all parties military forces;
- (e) To develop, as soon as possible, preferably within 30 days of the adoption of the resolution, in cooperation with relevant international financial institutions, international development organizations, and donor nations, an action plan for the overall implementation of a voluntary disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and repatriation (DDRR) programme for all armed parties; with particular attention to the special needs of child combatants and women; and addressing the inclusion of non-Carana combatants;
- (f) To carry out voluntary disarmament and to collect and destroy weapons and ammunition as part of an organized DDRR programme;
- (g) To provide security to the highest priority locations within capabilities and areas of deployment;

Protection of Civilians:

All necessary action, up to and including the use of deadly force, aimed at preventing or responding to threats of physical violence against civilians, within capabilities and areas of operations, and without prejudice to the responsibility of the host government to protect its civilians.

Support for Humanitarian and Human Rights Assistance:

- (h) To facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance, including by helping to establish the necessary security conditions;
- (i) To monitor the human rights situation, to contribute towards international efforts to protect and promote human rights in Carana and to fight impunity, with particular attention to

vulnerable groups including refugees, returning refugees and IDPs, abductees, women, children and demobilised child soldiers, as well as provide human rights technical assistance as needed in close cooperation with other United Nations agencies, related organizations, government organizations and non-governmental organizations;

Support for Security reform:

- (j) To assist the Carana Government of National Reconciliation (GNR) in monitoring and restructuring of the police force of Carana, consistent with democratic policing and international standards, to develop a civilian police training programme, and to otherwise assist in the training of civilian police in cooperation with interested organizations and interested States;
- (k) To assist the Carana Government of National Reconciliation (GNR) in the formation of a new and restructured Carana military in cooperation with international organizations and interested States;

Support for Implementation of the Peace Process:

- (l) To assist the Carana Government of National Reconciliation (GNR) in conjunction with other international partners, in the reestablishment of national authority throughout the country, including the establishment of a functioning administrative structure at both national and local level;
 - (m) To assist the new Carana Government of National Reconciliation (GNR) in preparing for national elections scheduled for no later than end 20xx;
 - (n) To assist the Carana Government of National Reconciliation (GNR) conjunction with other international partners in developing a strategy to consolidate governmental institutions, including a national legal framework and judicial and correctional institutions;
8. *Demands* that all the parties cease hostilities throughout Carana and fulfill their obligations under the Kalari Peace Agreement;

9. *Reiterates* its demand that all States in the region cease military support for armed groups in neighbouring countries, take action to prevent armed individuals and groups from using their territory to prepare and commit attacks on neighbouring countries and refrain from any actions that might contribute to further destabilisation of the situation in the region, and declares its readiness to consider, if necessary, ways of promoting compliance with this demand;
10. *Authorizes* UNAC to use all necessary means, within the limits of its capabilities and areas of deployment, to carry out its mandate as set out in paragraph 7 and *requests* UNAC's civilian and military components to coordinate their work with the aim of supporting the tasks outlined in paragraph 7 above;
11. *Authorizes* French troops, within the limits of their capacities and areas of deployment, to use all necessary means, from the commencement of the activities of UNAC until the end of UNAC's mandate as authorized in this resolution, to intervene in support of elements of UNAC when under imminent and serious threat upon the request of the Secretary-General, further requests France to report to the Council on the implementation of this mandate in Carana and to coordinate reporting with the reporting by the Secretary-General referred to in paragraph 24 below and decides to review this mandate within six months after its commencement;
12. *Encourages* UNAC within its capabilities and areas of deployment, to support the voluntary, safe and dignified return of refugees and IDPs;
13. *Calls upon* all parties to ensure, in accordance with relevant provisions of international law, the full, safe and unhindered access of relief personnel to all those in need and delivery of humanitarian assistance, in particular to IDPs and refugees.
14. *Recognizes* the importance of the protection of children in armed conflict, in accordance with its resolution 1379 (2004) and related resolutions;
15. *Demands* that all parties cease all use of child soldiers, that all parties cease all human rights violations and atrocities against the Caranan population, and stresses the need to bring to justice those responsible;
16. *Requests* the Secretary-General to ensure full compliance of UNAC with the United Nations zero-tolerance policy on sexual exploitation and abuses and to keep the Council fully informed if such cases of misconduct occur;
17. *Reaffirms* the importance of a gender perspective in peacekeeping operations and post-conflict peace-building in accordance with

resolution 1325 (2000) and in particular women's rights under the Constitution to fully participate in the political, economic and social spheres of Caranan life, recalls the need to address violence against women and girls as a tool of warfare, and encourages UNAC as well as the Caranan parties to actively address these issues;

18. *Calls on* the international community to consider how it might help future economic development aimed at achieving long-term stability in Carana and improving the welfare of its people;
19. *Stresses* the need for an effective public information capacity, including the establishment as necessary of a United Nations radio station to promote understanding of the peace process and the role of UNAC among local communities and the parties;
20. *Calls on* the parties to engage for the purpose of addressing the question of DDRR on an urgent basis and urges the parties, in particular the Carana Government of National Reconciliation (GNR), and rebel groups MPC and CISC, to work closely with UNAC, relevant assistance organizations, and donor nations, in the implementation of a DDRR programme;
21. *Requests* the Carana Government of National Reconciliation to conclude a status-of-forces agreement with the Secretary-General within 30 days of adoption of this resolution, and notes that pending the conclusion of such an agreement the model status-of force agreement dated 9 October 1993 (A/45/594) shall apply provisionally;
22. *Calls upon* all parties to co-operate fully in the deployment and operations of UNAC, including through ensuring the safety, security, and freedom of movement of United Nations personnel, together with associated personnel, throughout Carana;
23. *Call on* the international donor community to provide assistance for the implementation of a DDRR programme, and sustained international assistance to the peace process, and to contribute to consolidated humanitarian appeals;
24. *Requests* the Secretary-General to keep the Council regularly informed of the situation in Carana and the implementation of the mandate of UNAC, to report to the Council within 45 days of the adoption of this resolution and then every three months on the security situation, the priority political elements, relevant information on the progress, promotion and protection of human rights and international humanitarian law as well as a review of troop level, force generation and deployment of all UNAC constituent elements;

25. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.



Security Council

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26 M 20xx

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Statement by the President of the Security Council

At the 5917th meeting of the Security Council, held on 26 M 20xx, in connection with the Council's consideration of the item entitled "The question concerning Carana", the President of the Security Council made the following statement on behalf of the Council:

"The Security Council expresses its grave concern to the ongoing deterioration of the political, security and humanitarian environment in Carana, and the serious consequences for the population of this country and the region. It deplores the loss of life that has already occurred, and fears that the failure, thus far, to reach a political settlement may result in further bloodshed, and calls for an immediate end to hostilities.

"The Security Council commends the 8th Continent Regional Coalition (CRC) for its role in mediating between the parties and urges it to use its influence to promote a peaceful solution, stressing that the crisis in Carana can be resolved only through a negotiated political solution in which all parties, both those involved in the conflict and within the region, work actively to achieve such a solution.

"The Security Council firmly condemns the continued use force to influence the political situation in Carana and calls for a return to the principles of the 1991 constitution, and urges all parties to agree terms for a lasting peace agreement that addresses the underlying causes of the conflict and reestablishes confidence among the parties.


"The Security Council also expresses its concern at the humanitarian consequences of the crisis in Carana. It calls upon the international community to provide urgent humanitarian assistance to those in need in all the countries of the subregion that are affected by the Caranian crisis. It also calls on all parties to provide unhindered access to the affected populations."

"The Security Council condemns the deaths of innocent civilians and human rights abuses in Carana and calls for such incidents to be fully investigated. The Council calls upon the Government and all other parties to respect human rights and take immediate steps, with support from the international community, to reverse the climate of impunity, particularly in the context of the use of children in armed conflict.

"The Security Council affirms its readiness to consider the active involvement of the United Nations, in coordination with the CRC, including through concrete sustainable and effective measures, to assist in the implementation of an effective ceasefire agreement and in an agreed process for political settlement of the conflict.

"The Security Council will continue to monitor closely the situation in Carana and remains engaged on the matter."

CARANA COUNTRY STUDY



CARANA GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS

AICF	Action Internationale Contre la Faim
AO	Area of Operations
ARC	American Refugee Committee
AZ	Assembly Zones
BEC	Banque Economique de Carana
CAO	Chief Administrative Officer
CARE	Cooperative for American Relief Everywhere
CCP	Commission for the Consolidation of Peace
CDF	Carana Defence Force
CISC	Combattants Indépendants du Sud Carana
CNP	Carana National Police
CPD	(United Nations) Civilian Police Division
CRC	Continent Regional Coalition
CRCAC	CRC Assistance Mission to Carana
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization & Reintegration
DDRR	Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration & Repatriation
DMZ	Demilitarized Zone
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
DRC	Danish Refugee Council
DRCC	Demobilization and Resettlement Commission Committee
ELF	Elassasonian Liberation Front
FC	Force Commander
FCO	Field Communications Office
HOM	Head of Mission
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IO	International Organization
IRC	International Rescue Committee
JC	Joint Commission
JCC	Joint Commission for the Ceasefire
JLT	Joint Liaison Team
MDM	Medécins du Monde
MILOBS	Military Observers
MNF	Multi National Force
MODUK	Ministry of Defence of UK
MPC	Movement Patriotique de Carana
MPS	Military Planning Service
MSF	Medecins sans Frontieres
NGO	Non-Government Organizations

OHCHR	Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PDC	Parti Démocratique de Carana
PF	Patriotic Front (generic term)
PfP	Partnership for Peace
ROE	Rules of Engagement
RoRo	A Roll-on Roll-off capability
SCR	Security Council Resolution
SOFA	Status of Forces Agreement
SRSG	Special Representative to the Secretary-General
TCC	Troop Contributing Country
UKDEL NATO	UK Delegation in NATO
UKMIS GENEVA	UK Mission in Geneva
UN PKF	United Nations Peacekeeping Force
UNAC	United Nations Assistance to Carana
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational and Scientific Organization
UNHCR	United Nations Children's Fund
UNICEF	United Nations International Development Organization
UNIDO	United Nations High Commission for Refugees
UNHQ	United Nations Headquarters New York
UNPOL	United Nations Police
WB	World Bank
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organization
WV	World Vision (NGO)
ZOS	Zone of Separation

Background Notes

After years of violent conflict between the Carana dominated Government of Carana and rebel forces, a ceasefire agreement (Kalari Treaty) was signed on 19th M+1 20xx in an attempt by the regional organization the Continent Regional Coalition CRC) to put a halt to the violence and pave the way for a peace process in Carana. The ceasefire agreement foresees that a United Nations mandated mission would take over from the light CRC observer mission in Carana (CRCAC) to assist in overseeing and verifying the ceasefire as well as in the stabilisation of the country. The UN Security Council in Resolution 1544 of M+3 20xx authorised the establishment of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Carana (UNAC) under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. United Nations Headquarters New York (UNHQ) has planned the mission to date using its internal capacities. A Carana country study and technical survey have been completed as well as a basic UN strategic concept.

Geography

Location

Carana is located on the east coast of the 8th continent between the 8th and 10th latitudes. The total area of Carana is 120 000 sq km with 300 km coastline. Carana has land boundaries of 1500 km with its neighbouring countries.

Topography

Carana is topographically divided into two major areas: the plains in the eastern and central parts of the country and the highlands in the West and Southwest areas. The terrain in Carana generally increases in elevation from East to West from sea level through to a height of 1200 m. The ground undulates in most areas with insignificant areas of rocky, steep terrain. The terrain along the coastline is flat and sand covered with no cliffs or rocks. The water is calm but with only a few areas suitable for deep-water ships.

Hydrography

The three main rivers in Carana, the Kalesi, Mogave and Torongo, flow from the western highlands in an easterly direction and discharge in the ocean. The Kalesi River discharges in a large delta with surrounding swamp lands. Though all major rivers are in principle navigable, the Torongo is the only waterway used for transportation. Two dams along the Kalesi and Mogave are used to produce electricity. Carana has no large natural lakes.

Climate and Weather

The climate in Carana is hot and humid. Close to the equator, Carana has no distinct winter and summer. The average daily temperature during the dry season is 36 degrees C; the average nightly temperature is 22 degrees C. The rainy season runs from early October to December with an average precipitation rate of 250 mm a month.

Vegetation

Carana was originally completely covered by jungle and dense bush land. Over the last century, the central and eastern areas have been cleared and cultivated, being used for agricultural purposes. Even though the soil in Carana is fertile, the intensive use of the land as pasture has left large areas barren and useless for agricultural purposes. Approximately 20% of the total area is currently in use for growing grain, millet, vegetables and fruit. The west and south of the country is still covered by jungle and dense bush land. Small areas in the jungle are cleared and used for agricultural purposes.

Natural Resources

Carana is rich in natural resources, which are not equally dispersed throughout the country. In the jungle covered mountains of the west, rare wood and timber are the main natural resources. Diamonds are found along the Kalesi River in the provinces of Mahbek and Barin. Copper is mined in the highlands west of Mia. Coal is mined in the province of Hanno.

The soil in Carana is naturally fertile. The rivers and coastal waters are rich in fish.

Population

General Facts

Total Population	14 million
Population Growth	3.6%
Age Distribution	<15 : 44 % 15 to 18 : 13 % 18 to 60 : 39 % >60 : 4 %
Fertility Rate	5.1 children per woman
Sex Ratio	1.06 females/male
Infant Mortality	9.1 deaths per 100 live births
Life Expectancy	Total population: 45.3 years Male: 42.1 years Female: 47.9 years
Language	In Carana there are more than 20 original languages or tribal dialects

	spoken. The official and administrative language is French.
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Ethnic Distribution

The population of Carana consists of more than 15 ethnic groups. Most of these groups are small in number and socially and politically marginalised. The three major ethnic groups, the Caran, Kori and Tatsi represent 90 percent of the population. The Kori (38%) live in the west and are the dominant ethnic group in the provinces of Tereni and Koloni. The Caran (49%) are the ethnic majority in the country and live in the east and centre of Carana. The Tatsi (13%) live in the south, mainly in Leppko Province.

The national boundaries result from the colonial time and do not represent the ethnic distribution of the region. The Caran make up 10% of the population of neighbouring Sumora, the Kori make up 38% of the population of Katasi and the Tatsi make 45% of the population of Rimosa.

Religion

According to 2010 World Bank estimates some 75% of the population of Carana are Christian. Islam is practised by over 20%, mainly in the South. About 35% of the population are Protestant, Lutherans and Baptists, while 40% are Roman Catholic. The vast majority of Muslims are Sunni who overwhelmingly live in the South, however, there are small but active Shia communities along the coastal plains. In terms of ethnic distribution the majority of the Caran are Catholic, while the majority of the Kori are Protestant. The Tatsi people are mainly Sunni Muslim.

The 1991 Constitution (suspended) provides for freedom of religion while prohibiting certain forms of religious fundamentalism. Christian holidays are celebrated as national holidays. Missionary groups within Carana are tolerated and include Lutherans, Baptist, Grace Brethren and Jehovah's witnesses. They tend to operate only in the West and South. The Catholic Church is influential in Caran occupied territories.

History

Colonial Period

The State of Carana was founded in 1904 as French colony. Since the French administration focused on the exploitation of the natural resources and accepted the tribal and religious structures of the country as well as the role of local authority, the period between 1919 and 1951 was relatively calm

and peaceful. The following period from 1951 to 1955 was characterised by rapidly evolving civil unrest based on the increasingly popular movement for national liberation. Starting in 1952, unrest and riots were frequent and developed into more organised actions and violence against the colonial power. In 1954, the French lost control of most of the country outside the capital and the main coastal cities. To retain a minimum level of control, they were forced to agree to certain forms of cooperation and to an autonomous State of Carana.

In 1955, the legal status of Carana changed from a French colony to a republic of the French community. In 1962, Carana gained independence. As a result of a long period of French colonial rule, a strong French influence on nearly all-cultural, social and economic aspects of the country is still visible, and in some areas still dominates. Important parts of the infrastructure, particularly the railway and road systems, were built during the French colonial period and have not been improved until recently. The architecture of the political/administrative system in Carana also reflects the strong French influence imposed over recent decades.

Post Colonial Developments

After the liberation of Carana, Joseph Uroma (the leader of the largest of the liberation movements and with a power base derived from the backing of the Caran majority in the east of the country) came to power and immediately tried to cut all ties with France. He attempted to establish a communist system with the assistance of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and Cuba. With significant economic and military support, he successfully established his regime and suppressed all other liberation movement parties and opposition groups. During the first years of his government, Uroma received broad public support and enhanced powers. As a result of the deteriorating economic situation and the inability of the Uroma regime to establish effective governmental functions, public support declined and opposition to his leadership increased. In 1971, Uroma was expelled from power and killed. Christian Hakutu, the former Chief of the Caran dominated Army, replaced him. Hakutu re-established the links with France and promised massive social and economic reforms. Even though he received intensive support from western countries, Hakutu was unable to solve the economic problems and stabilise the country. In 1975, Hakutu was removed from power by a coup and replaced by a military junta under Colonel Tarakoni, also Caran. The military government of Tarakoni was also unable to address the economic and humanitarian issues but was quite successful in maintaining public order in the country.

In 1983, the economic situation had deteriorated to such a degree that only a massive injection of international aid could prevent the country from falling in to a humanitarian crisis. During the crisis opposition groups evolved and challenges to the Tarakoni regime became more frequent. After years of

instability, and under international pressure, free elections were conducted in 1986.

The Parti Démocratique de Carana (PDC) won the elections and Jackson Ogavo (PDC leader) became the first elected president of Carana. Initially the government was reasonably representative of the ethnic balance of the country, although still dominated by the Caran, and it followed democratic principles that were later enshrined in the 1991 Constitution. During the early years some economic and social reforms were realised but over time, Ogavo's focus changed and he became preoccupied with suppressing all opposition groups and enhancing his own power base. Since 1995 he expanded the influence of the central government on all economic and social activities by laws and administrative rules. The replacement of all key Kori and Tatsi government ministers with members of Ogavo's Caran tribe led to an increasingly repressive approach, administrative and economic inefficiency and corruption.

Since 2002, the previously growing economy has been in decline and regional humanitarian crises have occurred on a regular basis.

Current Situation

As a result of the economic situation and the discrimination of the Kori and Tatsi by the government, political opposition groups and rebel movements evolved in the mid 2000s. The government suppressed most of these groups, resorting to the military and gendarmerie to suppress any attempt to challenge Ogavo's regime.

In 2006 some small rebel movements in the Tereni province joined the larger and better organised rebel groups known as Movement Patriotique de Carana (MPC) and formed a well structured and efficient military opposition. The MPC achieved some local success in the west over the Caran dominated Carana Defence Force (CDF), gaining increasing support from the local population in the west of the country; in 2009 this culminated in the CDF losing control of significant parts of the western highlands. Though the MPC's military engagements were well coordinated and successfully executed, the rebels lacked a coherent political strategy and failed to capitalise on their success; their only stated objectives were to remove Ogavo from power and to secure better representation for non-Caran ethnicities

Low level but frequent MPC operations in the west increasingly tied down the CDF, leaving it with little real capability in the south of the country in Leppko Province, and creating an opportunity for elements of the predominantly Muslim Tatsi minority to attack government institutions. Initially this amounted to little more than a few localised incidents but it quickly escalated into more radicalised activities, including particularly brutal reprisals against ethnic

Caran civilians. Realising that the government could do little against them, a number of these small rebel groups united and called themselves CISC (Combattants Indépendants du Sud Carana).

Relations with Neighbouring Countries

The relations between Carana and Sumora are traditionally good. Even though the Caran make up only 10% of the population of Sumora they are strong politically. In the recent past, the government of Sumora has tended to support the position of President Ogavo.

The relations between Carana and Katasi are strained. Carana accused Katasi several times of supporting the MPC rebels with money, weapons and fighters; these allegations were not without foundation and have been corroborated by reports from a number of international organisations, although the scale of support remains unclear. Nonetheless it is sufficient to ensure that Carana lays the blame for its inability to deal with the MPC at Katasi's door.

The relations between Carana and Rimoso are also strained. There is a perennial civil conflict in Rimoso. Rimoso, has been in the grips of a civil war between two rival ethnic groups, the majority Tatsi, who hold nearly all positions of power in the Rimosan government, and the minority Muslim Elassi, pastoralists who claim that they suffer ethnic discrimination and persecution. Most of the interethnic fighting in Rimoso has taken place in northern Rimoso, near the border of Carana. There, a shadowy rebel army calling itself the Elassi Liberation Front (ELF) has waged a guerrilla-style campaign against government forces and pro-government Tatsi militias. The ELF is said to have loose links with the CISC in Carana.

Carana is a member of the 8th Continent Regional Coalition (CRC). This coalition, consisting of the 12 countries of the continent, is focused primarily on improving the continent's economic well-being. On occasions, however, the coalition has brought political and diplomatic pressure to bear when tensions arise between some of the Member States of the CRC. Since early 2011 the CRC has attempted to mediate between the groups in Carana and in February of that year it did succeed in bringing the main groups to the negotiating table, only to see the opportunity for peace slip away when a member of the Sumoran government, which held the CRC presidency, was accused of arranging arms shipments to President Ogavo. The allegations were subsequently proven to be unfounded but too late to save the talks.

The rotating CRC presidency was assumed by Kazuri at the end of 2012. Being more distant from Carana, Kazuri has the advantage of not being seen to have any vested interest in the conflict, and has made renewed efforts to resume negotiations.

Political System

Government

Carana is governed under a constitution adopted by a referendum in 1991. It is a presidential republic with a president as head of state, elected for a five-year term. The head of the government is the Prime Minister who is appointed by the President. The Prime Minister appoints the ministers and heads of the government departments.

A Parliament with 256 elected members has broad authority and was intended to be representative of the ethnic balance of the country.

Although the constitution supports a democratic political system, President Ogavo has gradually suppressed any effective opposition and since about 2000 Carana has effectively been a one party state. Today the only legal political party is the Caran-dominated PDC (Parti Démocratique de Carana). All members of parliament are members of the PDC or have close ties to the PDC.

Administration

Carana is administratively divided into eight provinces. The Capital is Galasi. The Province Capitals are Galasi, Maroni, Sureen, Alur, Faron, Folsa, Amsan and Corma.

The President appoints the governors who are the administrative heads of the provinces and report directly to the President. The administrative system of Carana is a centre-orientated administration. The central government controls most governmental issues.

The provinces are divided into a number of districts. The political and administrative role of these districts is not defined in the constitution. Most district boundaries were established by the French colonial administration. Side by side with the formal administrative structure, there exists a traditional system built around chiefdoms. Chiefdom chiefs exercise considerable de-facto authority, particularly in rural areas, and preside over traditional courts applying unwritten customary legal codes, which vary across ethnic and religious groups. Sharia law is prominent in Leppko province amongst the Tatsi people.

Judicial System

Carana's judicial system is based around a Supreme Court, provincial courts and district courts. All politically sensitive cases are the responsibility of the Supreme Court or the provincial court. The government appoints judges in these courts. Governors appoint judges to the district courts. Government control over the district courts varies, depending on the region. In some regions, local traditional authorities have considerable influence over the district courts.

Under the constitution, the judicial system is designed to counter the political weight of the government. However, as a result of the judiciary's politicisation under the one party system, its independence is highly questionable. In addition, the judiciary sector has for years lacked institutional capacity and resources and suffered from limited territorial coverage as well as endemic corruption. Basic administrative tools are missing, and, as a result, the case management flow does not work properly and response times for cases are extremely long. Salaries of judicial staff often are unpaid for months, leading to absenteeism and corruption. Meanwhile, legislation remains outdated and often discriminatory against women, ethnic minorities and other vulnerable groups. There is no functioning juvenile justice system, and no public defence counsel service. The legal education system, centred on the University of Galasi Law School, has come to a standstill through a lack of government funding.

Media

There are approximately 20 daily newspapers, two radio stations and two television channels in the country. The radio stations are operated by state cooperatives while most newspapers are privately owned. The two largest newspapers are government owned; another one is published by the Catholic Church. Additionally, there are some low power community radio stations and locally printed media with local and very limited distribution.

In principle, the Ministry of Information controls all media. The censorship is very limited in the case of the small, local media but nearly absolute in the case of the official radio stations and main newspapers.

Economy

Economic System

The economy in Carana is based on a free market system with free enterprise but with strong government participation and influence. The government controls the mining sector and all foreign trade activity; however, rebels control some major diamond mining areas.

Basic Economic Data (of 2013)

GDP	9.3 \$ billion
GDP per capita	520 \$
GDP composition by sector	Agriculture: 27% Manufacturing: 16% Mining: 32% Services: 25%
GDP growth	1919 to 1997: average 3% per year 2010: -4%

	2011: -2.5% 2012: -2.8% 2013: -6.9%
Inflation rate	+75%
Unemployment rate	Total: N/A In urban areas more than 30%
Currency	CFr (Carana Franc) 100 CFr = 1.5 \$

Banking and Monetary Economy

The Central Bank of Carana is responsible for the national currency reserve, the international currency exchange and all government monetary transactions.

Constitutionally, the Central Bank is responsible for the currency value and economic growth. In reality, the Central Bank is more a government institution than an independent instrument for economic growth and stability.

The government owned BEC (Banque Economique de Carana) is the only monetary institution operating on a countrywide basis. The BEC is represented in all provincial capitals and some of the larger towns.

Some private international banks have branches in the capital.

Mining

The mining of diamonds and copper is an important contributor to the GDP. Along with rare wood, timber and cotton, diamonds and copper are the main export of Carana. Coal is mostly used in the country for production of electricity.

Prior to 1996, the mining industry was controlled by private enterprise but since then the government has progressively taken control of the industry.

Manufacturing

Manufacturing contributes 16% to the GDP. The main activities in this sector are the food and fish industries, production of goods for local markets, and the processing of timber and textiles. The manufacturing sector suffers from a lack of infrastructure, skilled workers, an inefficient administration and widespread corruption.

Agriculture

Approximately 31% of the total land area of Carana is used for agricultural purposes. The goods produced, fruits, corn, and grain are sold mostly on the local market. Cotton is the only significant agricultural commodity that is exported.

Most of the agricultural land exists as small farm lots owned by the local population. Cotton is the only commodity produced on large farms using employed labour.

Foreign Trade

Carana's main exports are timber, diamonds, copper, cotton and to a lesser extent fish, fruit and woodcrafts. Carana's main imports are industrial products, vehicles, food, and petroleum products.

Carana has established trade relations with its neighbours and with France. Until 1996, Carana had a positive trade balance.

Infrastructure

Roads

Carana had a well-developed road network, capable of supporting commercial traffic, with practically all major towns connected. However, the years of civil war, harsh weather, minimal investment and maintenance have degraded it significantly with the result that the road network is often impassable in the rainy season.

As well as the paved roads, there is an intricate network of unpaved roads and tracks. The bridges throughout this network are generally of wooden construction and are rarely capable of sustaining heavy vehicle movement.

At the moment, rural lines of communications are degraded limiting the speed of vehicles to 12 km/h.

Railroads

Carana has two railroad tracks with a total length of 280 km. The entire track system and loading facilities were built during the French colonial period. One track connects Galasi with the coal mining area east of Sureen. The second track connects Maldosa and Mia, and was built to transport copper to the harbour in Turen. A lack of maintenance has resulted in the rail system being in bad shape, although it is still periodically operational.

Harbours

Carana has three deep-water harbours with varying capacities. The harbour at Galasi is the most developed and best-equipped harbour in the country, with a Roll-on Roll-off (RoRo) capability and working cranes.

The harbour in Cereni does not have a RoRo capability but is equipped with loading systems for containers for heavy goods.

The harbour in Maldosa was originally built for the loading of copper. It has railroad access but limited facilities for loading containers and heavy equipment.

Airports

Carana has two international airports in Galesi and Corma. Both airports are operational, capable of taking wide bodied aircraft, and used by international airlines. However, their cargo handling capacity is limited.

Additionally, there are 25 airstrips around the country. Not all of these airstrips have paved runways. The length and quality of facilities at each airstrip varies considerably.

Electricity

Carana could be relatively self-sufficient in the production of electricity; this is generated by two coal power plants and two hydro-electric power stations. The weakness lies in the distribution network which is only able to support Galasi, the provincial capitals, and some other cities. The rural areas have no access to the electricity system. Some small local water power plants and generators provide electrical power for small numbers of the rural population.

Water and Sanitation

The capital and some larger cities have a water supply system but only to the central area of the city. All other towns and villages rely on wells and water trading. The quality of water provided by the few supply systems does not meet international hygiene standards but causes no direct health threats for the population. The water quality in the rural areas is mostly satisfactory. However, the water quality of the crowded Galasi suburbs and the Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) camps is problematic.

There is no system of sanitation and garbage removal in Carana, leading to permanent disease and health problems particularly in the heavy populated areas.

Telecommunications

There is no telecommunications system outside of Carana's capital. The land-line telephone system covers less than 20% of the city and is unreliable. Consequently cellular telephone coverage is expanding and generally covers the main towns and routes throughout the country, and some of the remoter border areas that can access nodes in neighbouring countries.

Governmental institutions and major companies also use satellite communications, particularly in the more remote areas.

Military and Security

Security Overview

Though there have been several conflicts with neighbouring countries in the past few decades, and while relations with Katasi and Rimosia remain

strained, the likelihood of conflict is low. There is no current external military threat to Carana.

The main internal security problems centre around the ongoing conflict between armed groups and the government which is increasingly becoming more radicalised and the high level of criminal activity, some of it organized in urban areas, resulting from the poor economic situation. In the North and West there is increasing evidence of criminal usurpation of the diamond mining, probably with government involvement and controlled by cartels based in Sumora.

An estimated 50,000 people have been killed in the last six months and anything up to 300,000 have been forced to flee their homes as a result of the fighting between government forces and rebels in the north and the south. Many civilians have been abducted by armed groups, mainly by extremist rebel elements, but also by the CDF.

Military

Structure of the CDF

The CDF has a total strength of approximately 10,000 men (9,000 Army, 800 Air Force, 200 Navy). The chiefs of the services report directly to the President.

With a small number of coastal and river patrol boats the Navy plays a specialised but minor role in the Defence Force.

The Air Force, equipped with a squadron of armed helicopters, transport helicopters and a few light bombers has a limited strike capacity. This capacity allows the government to project its power over the entire country, but is insufficient to deliver decisive strikes against the various rebel groups.

The main service in the CDF is the Army, primarily but not solely recruited from the Caran people, and its senior leadership is almost wholly Caran. Structured in four area commands it represents the power of the central government all over the country. Their areas of responsibility do not match the administrative and provincial boundaries, but reflect the location of the headquarters and their troops.

Area Command	Location	Assigned Troops
North	Maroni	2 Inf Bn, 1 Airborne Bn, 1 Arty Bn, 1 Engr Bn, 1 AAA Btry, MP, Mil Band
West	Alur	2 Inf Bn, 1 Arty Btry
Central	Folsa	1 Inf Bn, 1 Engr Coy, 1 Recce Coy

South	Corma	2 Inf Bn, 1 Recce Coy
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Major Equipment

The French Government provided most of the existing military equipment during the 1980s and early 1990s. Since this time, equipment maintenance has often suffered from a lack of spare parts and well trained mechanics. The level of equipment availability is estimated as low.

Army

Type	Quantity	Role
AMX 13	12	Light Tank
Mamba	17	Reconnaissance Vehicle
AML 60/90	11	Reconnaissance Vehicle
M 3	21	APC
M 2	11	105 mm Artillery Gun
120 mm Brandt	14	Mortar
81 mm Brandt	27	Mortar
RCL M 40	8	106 mm Recoilless Launcher
Panhard M 3 VDA	9	Self-propelled Anti-Aircraft Gun
L 60	17	20 mm Anti-Aircraft Gun

Air Force

Type	Quantity	Role
Alpha Jet C	6	Ground Attack
Fokker 100	3	Communication
Cessna 421	2	Communication
F 33 C Bonanza	4	Training
Aerospital SA 330 H Puma	6	Utility
Aerospitale SA 316 Alouette	5	Utility/Communication

Navy

Type	Quantity	Role
Suscal A	3	150 to Coastguard Boat
LC-84	2	River Patrol Boat

Presidential Guard

The Presidential Guard has a strength equivalent to two infantry battalions (about 1500 personnel) and it is not part of the regular defence force. The commanders and most officers are Caran and recruited by President Ogavo. Members of the Presidential Guard have received intensive training and are entitled to several privileges. This unit is a loyal elite force with the task to protect the President. It is also used for special purpose tasks. In the recent past, the Presidential Guard was used several times, together with Gendarmerie units, to fight against the rebel groups, and has a reputation for being particularly brutal.

Police

The Carana law enforcement agencies are divided into the Carana National Police (CNP) and the Gendarmerie. CNP are located in population centres and are controlled by the Ministry of Interior via the provincial administration. The Gendarmerie is part of the Ministry of Defence and maintains the police presence in rural areas and is responsible for border security. However, in recent years the Gendarmerie has been used more often to suppress opposition political groups than for rural security or border control. In addition, CDF units often undertake policing tasks in the internal security role.

In recent years, CNP and Gendarmerie have suffered a critical shortage of qualified personnel, logistical and financial resources, and training. In addition, they have been plagued by heavy politicisation, corruption and mismanagement. Police presence in Carana is very low. The estimated number for CNP and Gendarmerie officers amounts to 10,000 officers, or one officer for every 1,400 citizens. Out of this number, only 5 % are female officers and they are in largely administrative roles.

Land and marine border policing, immigration, customs, port authority and other related sectors of internal security have ceased to function. In recent months, evidence of organised criminal activities, especially drug and human trafficking as well as diamond smuggling have come to light, in some cases involving collusion or active participation by law enforcement officials.

Crime rates, particularly in population centres, are high and there are numerous reports of human rights abuses perpetrated by the law enforcement agencies. This inefficiency and erosion of professional standards has led to a widespread loss of their credibility within the population.

Rebel Groups

MPC

The MPC is a secular organization with broad appeal that has a total strength of 6000 fighters, structured into groups of 700 men, with 10,000 to 20,000 supporters. The level of public support is high in the west and cuts across the different religions. Each of these groups is lead by a field commander and has a local network of supporters. While the groups have no internally defined

military structure they are based on a system of sub-commanders with different numbers of fighters. The loyalty to the sub-commanders is high and discipline is good.

The official HQ of MPC is in Alur but this is more a symbolic HQ than an operational one. In some areas the MPC have taken over government and basic administrative functions. As a result of broad public support for the rebels and the dissatisfaction with the government, the new role of the MPC is well-accepted by the largely Kori population in the west.

CISC

The CISC is an unstructured formation of rebels with diverse backgrounds. Some members are Tatsi deserters from the CDF, while others are refugees from the war in Rimosa. The total strength is estimated to be around 3000 fighters. Public support for CISC is based mainly in the Tatsi dominated Leppko Province. The movement has been successful in recruiting young men to its cause through a combination of government anti-Muslim excesses, religious zeal and the poor economic situation. The discipline and internal cohesion of this rebel group is currently low, as is the standard of training, although lately there is increasing evidence of the presence of experienced foreign extremists who have upped the tempo and quality of CISC operations.

Humanitarian Situation

Nutrition

Although all basic food is available at the market, large numbers of the population cannot afford the necessary food for sufficient nutrition. In rural area most people can compensate for inflation and unemployment through self-sufficient agriculture. However, severe nutritional problems exist in the urban areas and the IDP camps. A humanitarian emergency is forecasted to affect approximately 2 million people next year.

Health

Almost no medical infrastructure exists in the rural areas. The rudimentary health system that exists in the cities is unable to provide basic medical support.

One of the main humanitarian concerns in Carana is the acute lack of functioning medical facilities in the rebel held south and west. Here there is a critical lack of emergency supplies required for displaced and vulnerable populations, particularly in the IDP camps.

If the situation in the large cities continues to worsen, the threat of epidemics will increase. The World Health Organisation (WHO) has already reported 70 cases of cholera in Carana to date.

Refugees and IDPs

As a result of fighting in the west and south many people have been displaced from their homes. An estimated 100,000 have taken refuge in the neighbouring countries of Sumora (approximately 40,000 refugees), Katasi (approximately 40,000 refugees) and Rimosa (approximately 20,000 refugees). Another 100,000 have fled their homes but remained within Carana; most of these IDPs have headed east to Galasi and other coastal cities, where they are now clustered in makeshift camps and shantytowns in or near urban areas. Conditions of health, sanitation and hygiene in these areas are dangerously inadequate and increasingly provide a breeding ground for extremist discontent.

News of the arrival of a UN mission has lifted the hopes to return home of the nearly 200,000 refugees and IDPs. UNHCR, however, has expressed concerns about whether the environment is sufficiently safe and secure for their return. All parties to the conflict are reported to have used mines.

Finally, the country of Rimosa, sharing a border of approximately 200 km with Carana, has suffered from civil conflict between the two rival ethnic groups, the majority Tatsi and the minority Elassi. As a result, approximately 30,000 Elassi have taken refuge in southern Carana. Most of these Elassi refugees are sheltered in Camp Lora, near the village of Lora approximately 50 km from the Rimosan border, and are a source of potential instability within the Tatsi dominated Leppko Province. Camp Lora is maintained by UNHCR and two NGO implementing partners, Refugees International and Care for the Children.

REPORT OF THE UN TECHNICAL SURVEY OF CARANA



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Political

Overview

Despite the signing of the CRC –brokered Kalari Treaty (Peace Agreement), and the presence of the CRC observer mission CRCAC, Carana remains a politically unstable country. The government has little control over the western and the southern provinces of the country. Even in government-controlled areas, the Ogavo administration's real power had been limited and its replacement, the Government of National Reconciliation (GNR), has not yet been able to change these facts on the ground. An increasing level of public resistance is challenging the limited resources of the government's security forces. Governmental administration in the rebel-controlled areas is non-existent.

GNR

The Kalari Treaty called for the establishment of an ethnically representative Government of National Reconciliation pending the Presidential and national elections which will elect a new government. The GNR is now in place and struggling with its responsibilities.

Under the provisions for the Treaty, effective power is in the hands of a consensus Prime Minister. Lucien Langata, or LL as he is known, was a member of the PDC and Finance Minister until he took a stand against corruption in the mid 2000s. Narrowly escaping execution due to his popular following amongst the Caran, LL refused to leave Carana and President Ogavo had allowed him to live in relative obscurity. He is considered a popular and sensible choice for care-taker Prime Minister and enjoys sufficient support across the country to have a reasonable chance of pulling the GNR together.

While nominally still President, Ogavo has been indicted by the International Criminal Court (ICC) for crimes against humanity and now by the GNR for corruption. Unfortunately, he has disappeared and was last seen in Rimosa in late April. He is believed to be protected by a group of hard line former members of the Presidential Guard, most of whom still remain in Carana, based in the capital Galesi. Depending on the Guards loyalty, this nexus could potentially disrupt the peace process since there is neither the will nor the capability within the former security forces to track Ogavo down.

Political Parties

Carana has been essentially a one party state represented by the Parti Démocratique de Carana (PDC). Years of repression have destroyed any effective and legitimate opposition, or have driven it underground; any legitimate opposition capability is so fragmented that it is unlikely to be politically viable for some time.

Those opposition groups that do exist tend to be relatively insignificant, ethnically-based and provincial; this includes some communist groups in the capital and Maldosa, as well as Kori ethnic minority groups on the coast and the Tatsi grouping

in the South. However, these groups are not organised and have little importance because of their narrow interest and small following. Other groups having some political influence are the coal and copper miners' trade unions, which are mainly interest-based.

With an eye on future elections, the leadership of the MPC is currently developing its political platform and preparing for a long-term political role. Given its ability to coordinate activities against the government, it could become an effective political force. It enjoys broad cross-confessional public support in the west through its ability to be seen to address the concerns and needs of the people where the government has failed.

In contrast the CISC currently lacks the structure or organization that would enable it to develop into an effective political body. It owes its following to frustration over poor living conditions, general dissatisfaction with the excesses and religious discrimination of the Ogavo administration and longstanding ethnic hostilities with the Caran minority in Leppko province. It has never made an attempt to capitalise on its potential nor articulated any clear political objectives. It may become increasingly frustrated and radicalized when it sees itself marginalised.

Carana has no political diaspora or organised groups in exile.

Elections

While the Kalari Treaty calls for elections within 12 months, the current highly unstable security situation could threaten the credibility and legitimacy of such an ambitious electoral process.

After years of human rights violations, sectarian discrimination, despotism, civil war and corruption, the public trust in governmental institutions and activities is almost non-existent. Potential political opposition groups will be hard pressed to organise themselves in time to conduct an effective election campaign; this could result in calls to delay the elections, or attempts to subvert the electoral process itself. Nevertheless, the timeline for elections was a crucial element in the peace negotiations. There will be considerable pressure on the GNR to manage this process.

Another significant factor is the absence of an accurate census: the last national census having taken place in 1990. When combined with the large scale displacement of the population, voter registration will be a long, complex and costly exercise.

If all parties honour the commitments of the Kalari Treaty, it can be hoped that the MPC will participate in future elections and evolve into a legitimate political party. The long-term political role of the CISC is uncertain. A further uncertainty is the potential emergence of hitherto unidentified groups, some extremist, which are not signatories to the Kalari Treaty. Whether they join the political process or oppose it, there is a real danger of further political instability, leading to an increased violence and the ensuing security risks to the elections.

DDR

The requirement for all parties to the conflict to disarm is stated in the Kalari Treaty. It can be assumed that the MPC will honour this commitment if all parties adhere to the Treaty, especially in view of its political aspirations and its expectations for its fighters to be included within the restructured national armed forces.

Whilst there are no indications that CISC will not disarm in accordance with the Kalari Treaty, the lack of a proper organizational structure and the inherent lack of discipline within the various splinter factions will make it a high risk process. It is evident that some factions have become radicalized by Islamist extremists, and probable some factions will see themselves being disadvantaged, leading to freelance military activity, which may have sectarian, religious, political, or criminal motivation. Many of these CISC soldiers have also been involved in systematic sexual violence against Christian women, girls and young boys in reprisal for similar and historical CDF excesses against the Tatsi Muslim population. It is therefore difficult to determine how the integration of these armed groups will be perceived by the population in the affected areas. In the CISC group, there is also a high percentage of women and girls who have been abducted and now live with the militia. In effect, these women and girls also constitute the logistics and healthcare of the CISC military structure. A further complication is that these women are not welcome back into their original villages.

By extension, the most difficult part in the DDR process will be the disarmament and reintegration of any other armed groups which have no allegiance to any group, are not signatories of the Kalari Treaty and which focus is largely extremist or criminal.

Constitution and Judicial System

The Constitution and judicial system in Carana is based on modern democratic principles. Violations of human rights and other legal shortcomings stem from a systematic abuse and exploitation of the existing rules by the Ogava regime.

Under the "State of Emergency" (see below) a system of mixed civilian/military courts with very limited rights of appeal has been put in place to try all treason, terrorist and similar cases. Carana courts regularly impose the death penalty for serious crime.

A number of human rights organisations have issued reports outlining arrests, detentions and executions without due legal process. There are also reports of torture, including sexual abuse and rape, and uninvestigated deaths in the prisons. Many of the detainees are members of opposition political groups. Prison conditions generally give cause for concern and official records of who is being held are impossible to obtain. The ICRC has limited access to only the main prison in Galasi. There are reliable reports of children being detained with adults as well as men and women being held in the same facilities. Some of the women have their infants with them. In general, prisoners are treated harshly, conditions are inhumane, nutrition is inadequate and there is little or no medical assistance.

No information is available regarding the identity of prisoners held in CDF military holding facilities. Equally, the rebels are known to be holding many detainees.

Human Rights

Carana has ratified the following human rights treaties: the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; the International Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination; the Convention on the Elimination of all Discrimination Against Women; the Convention on the Rights of the Child; and the Convention Against Torture. It has also ratified the Statute of the ICC.

The Constitution states that all laws must be consistent with Carana's international human rights obligations. It underlines that these rights should be upheld regardless of gender, ethnic group or creed. In reality, Carana legislation contains many laws inherited from the colonial period, which are incompatible with international human rights standards – for instance the Carana criminal procedure code. The Constitution also contains a Bill of Rights, which refers mostly to civil and political rights. It is silent on other rights such as economic, social and cultural rights.

Currently, in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution, the Carana government has declared a "State of Emergency" which permits it to override the constitutional provisions, including its human rights elements. In 2013, the UN Commission on Human Rights appointed a Special Rapporteur on the situation of Human Rights in Carana. The Special Rapporteur has visited the country on a number of occasions and has sharply criticised all parties to the conflict for human rights abuses perpetuated against civilians generally, and women in particular. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict has also visited Carana and highlighted the disturbingly large number of children used in combat roles by rebel elements as well as by the national army.

The Carana Government does not have a human rights ministry – instead the lead responsibility for human rights is vested in the Minister of Justice. In 2008, the National Human Rights Commission was established. The commission is not compliant with the international standards for a national human rights institution as set out in the "Paris Principles". Carana has a number of active human rights NGOs, including women's and youth groups, whose freedom to operate has been inhibited by the fear of reprisals, but with the change in the situation they are becoming increasingly vocal. A number of international humanitarian NGOs are also represented in the country.

Gender Specific Considerations: Women

Carana holds 130th place in the Gender Development index ranking of Gender Development index and has high mortality rates in childbirth and low literacy rates for women. As many men are working in the mines or manufacturing

industry as well as being forcefully recruited to the military organizations, women are largely left with responsibility for small-scale farming to support extended families. This distribution of labour, which leaves many women vulnerable to threats, has resulted in their increased political awareness.

In parliament, however, women represent only 8% of members, which makes it difficult for their concerns to be heard. In public life women have held posts generally associated with assistance, i.e. women's affairs, health, etc. and have not been in decision-making positions. The only official women's organization is the women's wing of PDC which has advocated a return to traditional roles for women and men.

With the new political situation, women are mobilizing at the grass-root level. In the past, the State used abduction and rape to stigmatize and undermine female political involvement. The only women's organizations that could operate addressed less overt political issues such as children's issues (i.e. education, nutrition). However, there were women's organizations in the conflict-affected areas helping victims of sexual violence. These women's groups report high levels of domestic violence, including sexual abuse, especially in the IDP camps.

Systematic sexual violence was used in some of the conflict-affected areas. The CISC is one of the main perpetrators of violence resulting from their poor command and control structures. The CDF and law enforcement agencies are also responsible for sexual violence against civilians of the Kori and Tatsi ethnic groups. The conflict seems to have exacerbated the trafficking of women and children both internally and to neighboring countries. Trafficking in humans is related to the trafficking of weapons and drugs, all three of which have been used by the warring parties to continue the conflict.

Gender Specific Considerations: Men

Given the high crime rates, a large number of young men are being killed in crime related violence such as riots or gang fights. Men's health is also negatively affected by the working conditions in the mines and manufacturing industry. Trade unions have not been able to address this situation effectively, partly because of their political involvement in the conflict. Sanitary conditions in the shanty towns are poor with high levels of alcoholism and drug addiction as well as HIV/AIDS and sexually transmitted diseases. In the southern and western areas, affected by conflict, there is often forced recruitment of men, particularly the very young. As a result, many men are leaving the country with their families being left behind. Men involved in the political struggle can be subjected to violence with reports of sexual torture and rape being used against political prisoners. In the southern region, civilian men of the Caran minority are the main target of violence by the CISC. Similarly, civilian men of the Kori and Tatsi are targeted by the CDF in their campaigns.

The Situation with Regard to Girls and Boys

The political conflict along with a deteriorating economy has had a grave impact on the young population, of which 44 % is under the age of 15. Both girls and

boys leave school to help support their families. Forced genital mutilation of girls in their early teens, though illegal, is practiced extensively by both the Kori and the Tatsi. There has been extensive abuse of both boys and girls throughout the conflict by all parties. The CISC are the main culprits for abductions but also sections of the CDF have been reported to be responsible. This high degree of violence toward girls, boys and women has prompted public discussion about the need to fight violence against women in the society at large.

Security

Overview

The level of general security in Carana is very low as a result of the intense fighting between government and rebel forces, the poor economic situation, the sectarian tensions, the high number of displaced people, the low police presence outside of the capital and the widespread dissatisfaction with the government. Civil unrest is widespread and occurs on a regular basis. The level of crime is high and there is evidence that much of it, especially in the sectors of diamonds and narcotics, is both organized and transnational. Overall, the security situation in Carana must be assessed as "Medium Risk". Some areas, such as the territory around Galasi, as well as Hanno and Leppko Provinces, have to be assessed as "High to Very High Risk". Male abductees of all ages are often coerced into the fighting forces and girls and women are used as what amounts as slaves, including being forced to become "wives" of combatants. These women are also at times forced to participate in outright fighting. If they refuse they are killed. Rape and other forms of sexual abuse are commonplace and are used to intimidate.

Since March, at the invitation of the GNR, there has been an emergency deployment of a French force "Opération Intrépide" along the Rimosa border in the South West mountains. Their stabilizing effect is still uncertain. Of limited duration (6 months) the operation is designed to neutralize the emerging threat of extremist Islamic activity operating either side of the Carana/Rimosa border. The question remains, however, whether the stability they can bring to this region can be sustained once they withdraw.

Galasi

In Galasi the primary risk is the high level of crime in the suburbs and IDP camps around the capital. In the suburbs of Galasi gangs of male youth, of up to 100 in number, rule the streets. These gangs pose a threat even to unwary military formations. There is increasing evidence that their activities are organized and are funded by trafficking in narcotics and women. Within the IDP camps there is a high level of crime, mostly as a result of poverty and hopelessness, but this has been on the decline recently since the appearance of vigilante groups who dispense their own form of summary justice.

Akkabar

In Akkabar the coal mine workers went on strike in May 2015 as they had not been paid for four months. These men live in shantytowns in poor conditions, separated from their families. What started as an industrial dispute soon escalated into open conflict after excess use of force by the police resulting in the death of several

miners. In reaction, some miners have subsequently attacked a number of government institutions, particularly police stations and banks. Much of this may well be inspired by the criminal cartels. Activity is sporadic and often spontaneous but it has increasing local support.

Leppko

The breakdown of government authority in Leppko province has resulted in an increase in the number of uncontrolled armed groups, that together with CISC combatants, have preyed on the Kori and Caran elements of the local population. Much of this violence is radicalized and sectarian in nature. Many of these groups are former Elassi rebels from neighbouring Rimosa who have taken advantage of the unstable situation in Carana. Links between the CISC and these groups are denied by the CISC but several independent reports indicate such links exist. These groups are involved in the organised smuggling of weapons, drugs and women. It is hoped that Opération Intrépide will bring a needed degree of stability to the mountainous border areas.

Military

General Situation

Following the signing of the Kalari Treaty the signatory combatants have generally remained where they were, unwilling to concede any gains made, and each fearful that the other side might renege on its commitments. This has resulted in an unstable stalemate in a number of areas and, while no violations of the ceasefire have been reported, the close proximity of opposing forces poses a significant risk that will increase the longer it is allowed to continue. Therefore disengagement, separation and a start to the disarmament process are high priorities. Less predictable is the increasing presence of Islamist extremists operating out of Leppko Province, particularly in the mountainous South West adjacent to the Rimosa border; as well as the activities of radicalized non-signatory armed groups operating in Hanno and Leppko who are responsible for a continued level of violence against civilians.

Carana Defence Force (CDF)

The CDF have remained in their positions after the ceasefire. Four infantry battalions remained deployed along the separation line between CDF and MPC, and an additional three deployed in the South in Corma, Maldosa and North Leppko. The Airborne Battalion, in conjunction with Gendarmerie units, is deployed in the city of Maroni to handle the riots of the coal miners. The engineer units and the Reconnaissance Company are co-located in the North West with the Infantry Units. The location of the Artillery Battalion and the Air Defence Units is unknown.

The six Alpha Jets of the Carana Air Force can be assessed as non-operational. The helicopters have been used frequently for air patrols.

According to our own observations, the logistic situation for the CDF appears poor. Spare parts seem to be a particular problem.

The CDF has a reputation of not respecting international humanitarian law, with reported cases of sexual violence. This is primarily true of the CDF positioned in the South where historically there has been a sectarian element to their excesses.

MPC

Original assessment of the MPC strength was somewhat conservative and has been adjusted from a total of 6000 to approximately 10,000. Approximately 5000 MPC returned home last month but most have kept their weapons and remain ready to return to their formations if necessary. It is assessed that the remaining 5000 MPC rebels are sufficient to balance the presence of the CDF on the separation line and maintain the status quo, especially when backed up by the knowledge that they can quickly be reinforced. It is assessed that the underlying reason for this redeployment is to ensure that the front line MPC troops are logistically sustainable, and they certainly appear better prepared than many of their CDF counterparts.

The deployed elements of the MPC have established camps of up to approximately 250 mainly male soldiers (including their families and dependants) from whence they conduct patrols west of the separation line. While this is not in contravention of the Kalari Treaty it has the potential to trigger an engagement with the CDF whether by mistake or by design.

After the end of the formal fighting, the official HQ in Alur increased in importance and has become a basic administrative centre of the region. Some leaders of MPC are permanently in Alur.

The MPC operates a harsh public order regime but has repeatedly indicated that they respect human rights, especially the rights of children. As a result of broad public support and dissatisfaction with the government, the new administrative role of the MPC is increasingly accepted by the population in the West.

CISC

During the fighting, CISC fighters operated primarily from their villages without deploying in camps or permanent positions. After the fighting stopped, it can be assumed that most CISC rebels are living in their home villages and group only occasionally.

The loose structure of CISC makes it very difficult to assess their strength and positions precisely. It can be assumed that their number has not changed and remains in the region of 3000 active male fighters.

Hitherto the CISC has focused its attention on the CDF and has relied upon the strong anti-government feelings in the south for most of its support. However, recently there have been reports of several acts of what appears to be extremist violence against ethnic minorities in the south of Leppko adjacent to the border with Rimosa. It is not clear whether members of the CISC have been involved, which would be in violation of the Kalari Treaty, or whether these acts are the responsibility

of radicalized splinter groups that are not signatories. In any case, civilians from the Caran and other minorities in the region seem to be the target.

Unlike the MPC, the CISC has not tried to establish administrative functions or exercise control in the region except by the use of force. They are notably brutal in combat and show no regard for the rights of non-combatants.

Police

The concept of conventional policing is almost non-existent. In government controlled areas the police, both National Police and Gendarmerie, are viewed as elements to only enforce government policy and protect government interests. In the remainder of the country the police are targeted as they are so closely identified with the repressive Ogavo regime. Consequently, many have been killed, and others have either fled or changed allegiance. As a result, law and order is either maintained, or not, by the dominant militia group in any given area. In some areas, such as those in which the MPC has asserted control, a quasi capacity to maintain law and order exists. In others, mainly in the south, there is none at all. Certain crimes – such as domestic violence or Gender Based Violence – are not addressed at all by the police. Reporting sexual violence to the police entails the risk of renewed attack by the police itself, as the victim is sometimes considered as guilty as the perpetrator.

Where police do exist they are ill-trained, poorly paid, or not paid at all, with low morale. The result is that corruption remains endemic. Police stations have little equipment and that which they do have is of military origin and entirely unsuitable for a democratic police force. Police training, especially human rights training, has virtually ceased. To compound the problem the existing police structure is so identified with President Ogavo that no member of it would be accepted in the MPC or CISC controlled areas. Effectively this means that the South is lawless.

Economy

Prior to the civil war, the Caranian economy was already suffering from over a decade of negative growth due to excessive governmental control, corruption and a lack of efficient public administration. It continued to deteriorate during the war which brought the production of copper to a halt and saw much of the diamond production hijacked by a number of criminal groups. The flow of foreign currency reduced to a trickle, and what did exist was mostly used to buy weapons or was misappropriated. Fighting in rural areas meant that the timber industry was reduced to approximately 20% of its pre-conflict capacity and agricultural production fell to approximately 40-50%. The net result has been an inflation rate that has been running somewhere around 300% and a significantly reduced supply of basic commodities. The warfare in the countryside has also affected the small-scale farming used to support many women who are heads-of-household. This concerns widows as well as wives of men who are working in the mines or the manufacturing industry.

The result is an increasingly dire humanitarian situation, which has only been prevented from becoming a major crisis by external aid and reliance on a

subsistence economy. Inevitably the consequences are most acute in the major towns where increasing social dissatisfaction frequently erupts into violence.

Infrastructure

Roads

Carana has an adequate road network with paved routes connecting most parts of the country and key urban centres. In the west and the north, these roads also link to the networks in neighbouring Katasi and Sumora. A few paved roads can withstand the effects of the monsoon season, but most roads are in need of significant maintenance. Carana has also a comprehensive network of secondary (unpaved) roads and tracks, which often become impassable during the rainy season.

Bridges along the paved roads are normally steel and concrete constructions, which can carry trucks and heavy vehicles up to approx 20 tons. Those along the unpaved roads are normally of wooden construction and need to be assessed individually before they can be used by UN traffic.

Railways

The two railway tracks running between Galasi and Akkabar, and between Maldosa and Mia are both operational but degraded. Currently the Galasi to Akkabar line can go no further than Maroni as the main railway bridge was destroyed by flooding in 2010 and has yet to be repaired.

There are rail yards at Galasi, Maroni, Akkabar and Maldosa capable of handling containers, vehicles and other goods. The station in Mia is specialised for the transport of copper and has no freight handling facilities.

In common with the road network there has been little or no maintenance over the past few years, consequently the tracks are deteriorating and are likely to be subject to increasing restrictions both in terms of speed and capacity.

Harbours

In Carana there are three deep-water harbours and a number of smaller fishing ports. The smaller harbours have no capacity to support the loading and unloading of ships, but they are suitable for coastal vessels.

The main harbour in Galasi is well equipped, can handle large ships and has a roll-on roll-off (RoRo) and container capability. This harbour will not cause any limitations for deployment and support of a potential UN Mission.

The harbour in Cereni has no RoRo or significant container capability but is equipped with operational cranes and can take break-bulk ships up to approximately 600 ft in length. However, there is only limited dock space without disrupting regular trade; this effectively limits capacity to no more than two ships above the routine shipping.

The harbour in Maldosa in the South is geared to specialised handling for the export of copper but has a similar capacity to Cereni for the handling of regular transport ships. Only two wharves are equipped with cranes which will limit capacity, and there is very limited parking or storage space due to the harbour being in the town; this being said there is ample space on the western outskirts. Currently, the French Opération Intrépide has its main supply routes coming through Katasi, where they historically have had a base and a permanent military presence. The UN will need to find alternatives to this arrangement.

Airports

The international airports in Galasi and Corma are both operational and meet international standards for air traffic. Both airports have runways suitable for heavy transport aircraft.

The airport in Galasi is well equipped for handling heavy material and has ample ramp space in excess of its routine requirements. Space for storing equipment and assembling vehicles in close proximity to the airport is limited, but generally it meets most requirements for the deployment of personnel and equipment.

Limitations on ramp space and cargo handling capacity restrict the capacity of the airport at Corma, however it has almost unlimited space close to the airport for storage/parking, and there are no significant limitations to the deployment of personnel. The French have a small logistic presence at Corma in support of Intrepide.

The airstrips in Alur and Folsa are suitable for medium transport aircraft but they do not have equipment to handle heavy air cargo.

All other airstrips are only suitable for light fixed wing aircraft without additional construction work. They can be used for communication and small size personnel transport. Fuel supplies are only available in Galasi and Corma.

Airport	Paved Runway	Runway length	Paved Apron (Sqm)	Instrument Approach System	Loading Equipment
Galasi	Yes	3200 m	40 000	Yes	Yes
Corma	Yes	2700 m	10 000	Yes	Yes
Alur	Yes	1500 m	-	No	No
Folsa	Yes	1200 m	-	No	No
Amsan	Yes	1200 m	-	No	No
Mia	No	1100 m	-	No	No

Electricity

There are three operational power plants, the Kilu Dam, the Salobo Dam and two coal power plants in Galasi. In recent years, Carana was a net exporter of electricity during and after the rainy season. During the fighting most of the power supply equipment around the Salobo Dam was destroyed or damaged. The instability in the Hanno area, caused by the miners' unrest, has led to a shortage of coal and has limited the production of electricity.

Since the power supply system is not designed as a network with redundancies, but organised on a regional oriented star pattern, the damage of one main line can cut supply to a large area. Accordingly, most of the country is currently without regular power supply.

Water

Potable water is available in most parts of the country but the quality of water varies. In the more arid areas south west of Maldosa and west of Galasi drinking water is drawn mostly from small ponds and slow flowing brooks which are often of poor quality and a source of various water borne diseases. Daily collection of water is time-consuming and onerous, particularly for women. The drinking water close to the coal and copper mining areas is highly polluted, causing health problems for the men living in the surrounding shantytowns. These poor hygienic conditions are connected with a high infant mortality rate. Near the major rivers there is ample water supply but it still needs purification.

Humanitarian

Refugees and IDPs

The refugee and IDP situation remains unchanged from the information provided in the UN Country Team Report. IDPs are mainly women and their children and they mostly headed east to the capital and other coastal cities, where most are now clustered in makeshift camps and shantytowns in, or near, urban areas. The crime rate – such as murder, rape, domestic violence and theft – is high in the camps. The situation concerning health and sanitation is poor.

There is also fear among the refugee/IDP women that the already agreed DDR process will lead to the reintegration into their villages or areas of the men who sexually abused them.

Nutrition

As consequence of the economic crisis and the war, the price of food and basic goods increased dramatically. Even though all basic goods are available, large parts of the population cannot afford sufficient nutrition. The child mortality rate has dramatically increased over the last several years.

The most affected areas are north of Hanno, the area between Faron and Folsa and the coastal area south of Cereni, where the situation has already reached a crisis.

Landmines

During the conflict between CDF and rebels, landmines were used intensively by all parties, yet the nature of the conflict and the forces involved meant that very little documentation was maintained. Consequently, mines pose a major and unpredictable threat to the population at large, aid agencies and any potential peacekeeping mission. There is an immediate need to identify the areas of highest risk, many of which are in the west of the country, and begin action to reduce the threat.

The UN Country Team and Non-governmental Organisations in Carana

Despite the troubles in Carana, the United Nations has maintained a presence in the country through several relief and development agencies. Additionally, a number of NGOs operate in Carana. In many cases, these agencies and organisations have been on the ground working in Carana for at least 5-10 years. However, despite the Kalari Agreement, the continued levels of background violence has meant that large tracts of Carana are no-go areas for international humanitarian organizations. There is no Country Team presence in Hanno or Leppko provinces (apart from Corma) due to the high level of violence.

The UN Country Team in Carana consists of the following organizations:

- **World Food Program (WFP)**

Responsible for food distribution programmes and maintains offices in Galasi, Amsan, Corma, Folsa and Alur.

- **United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)**

The lead agency for programmes helping children; it has offices in Galasi, Folsa and Corma.

- **The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)**

Protects and assists refugees; it has offices in Galasi, and Alur

- **The World Health Organisation (WHO)**

Coordinates international health programmes; it has an office in Galasi.

- **The UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR)**

A small team based in Galasi, who are responsible for monitoring and reporting on human rights issues throughout the country.

- **United Nations Development Program (UNDP)**

Responsible for UN development activities. The UNDP Resident Representative is also the UN Resident Coordinator and chairs weekly UN country team

meetings in Galasi, attended by the heads of all the agencies above. She is currently the Designated Official for Security in Carana.

NGOs

A total of fifty international and local NGOs operate throughout Carana, providing services in various sectors including food, health, water, hygiene, sanitation, refugee and IDP issues, children's issues and women's issues. Additionally, the International Committee of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Society (ICRC), mandated to assist victims of war, is present in Maroni, Arum, Cereni, Maldosa, Corma, Folsa, Faron, Sureen, and Alur.

Public Information

In Carana, radio, TV and the major newspapers have been rigorously controlled by the government. There is no press freedom. Editors and journalists who have opposed the PDC have been imprisoned or have fled. International newspapers are only available in Galasi. Government approved national newspapers are available in the provincial capitals and in some other towns. For the past several months, the MPC has produced a regional newspaper and operates one radio station out of Alur.

As a result of the war several radio and TV transmission stations were destroyed, effectively leaving large areas of the country without access to information or TV and radio programmes.

Education

Prior to the civil war, Carana had one of the best developed education systems in the region from primary through to tertiary levels. The effects of war and a declining economy have seriously degraded the system, reducing the overall number of schools, particularly at the primary level, and resulting in a general decline in the number of students, particularly female. The decrease in the number of female students and therefore female literacy is particularly acute, the causes of which are the levels of violence as well as cultural discrimination.

Support

Notwithstanding the poor economic situation in Carana, most basic goods and supplies are still available, although both quality and availability can be erratic. Local purchase to meet UN mission requirements is therefore uncertain.

Fuel, construction material and food can be purchased, or contracted, in country, although the rampant inflation rate and the potential of a UN deployment is already leading to escalating prices.

Fuel and rations can be purchased in Galasi, Cereni, and Maldosa from international contractors.

There is an ample supply of timber which can be purchased from local dealers in the larger towns, but concrete and steel are only available in Galasi, Maroni, Corma and Maldosa. Basic construction work can be contracted in all larger towns.

Specialised construction materials such as plumbing parts, windows or doors are hard to get on the local market. In addition, furniture of adequate quality is largely unavailable. Technical goods such as IT equipment, vehicles and spares are generally unavailable in country.

Transport services can be contracted in the Galasi, Cereni and Maldosa although a series of truck driver strikes during the last year has meant that service has become unpredictable. There are no vehicle or aircraft rental companies currently in Carana.

Local Labour

Given the increased levels of unemployment following the war, there is no shortage of unskilled, or semi-skilled labour. Availability of skilled labour has reduced as many professional people left the country during the war. In the former two categories only approximately 30% have any English, the remainder uses either French or local dialects.

Banking

The banking system is only operational in Galasi, Cereni and Maldosa and it does not support electronic cash transfer in any location. In some provincial capitals and in some other towns, rudimentary banking functions do exist but these are of little practical significance.

Availability of Real Estate

In all towns over 50,000 inhabitants, office and accommodation is available for rent, although much is sub-standard and suffering from a lack of basic maintenance and facilities, particularly water, sanitation and power.

**IDP Refugee
Camp Facilities**

	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M
2	CARANA Camps: Facilities and Conditions*											
3	IDP Camps	Camp Administration	Road Access	Rail Access	Warehouse/ Distribution Points	Clinics	CMR^	Water Supply	Sanitation	Shelter	Security	# of IDP
4	A	Catholic Relief Services	Yes, Limited	Yes	1	1	0.32	Sufficient Quantity; Insufficient Quality	Poor	Poor	Fair	3,500
5	B	OXFAM	Yes	No	4	5	0.34	Insufficient Quantity and Quality	Poor	Poor	Poor	30,000
6	C	Mercy Corps	Yes	No	2	1	0.3	Adequate	Poor	Fair	Poor	7,500
7	D	OXFAM	Yes	No	3	3	0.22	Insufficient Quantity and Quality	Fair	Poor	Fair	18,000
8	E	Mercy Corps	Yes, Limited	No	2	2	0.35	Sufficient Quantity; Insufficient Quality	Poor	Poor	Poor	8,000
9	F	CARE	Yes	No	1	1	0.2	Insufficient Quantity and Quality	Fair	Poor	Poor	6,000
10	G	ICRC	Yes	No	1	1	0.21	Sufficient Quantity; Insufficient Quality	Fair	Fair	Fair	4,000
11	H	Catholic Relief Services	Yes	Yes	2	1	0.21	Adequate	Fair	Good	Fair	1,900
12	J	Mercy Corps	Yes	No	1	1	0.2	Sufficient Quantity; Insufficient Quality	Fair	Poor	Poor	8,500
13	K	Mercy Corps	Yes, Limited	No	1	2	0.23	Insufficient Quantity and Quality	Fair	Poor	Fair	22,000
14	L	OXFAM	Limited	No	1	1	0.23	Insufficient Quantity and Quality	Poor	Poor	Fair	1,800

**IDP Refugee
Camp Facilities**

	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M
15	Refugee Camp	Camp Administration	Road Access	Rail Access	Warehouse/ Distribution Points	Clinics	CMR^	Water Supply	Sanitation	Shelter	Security	# of Refugees
16	I	OXFAM	Yes, Limited	No	1	0	0.33	Insufficient Quantity and Quality	Poor	Good	Poor	1,400
17	Regional Camps: Facilities and Conditions											
18	IDP Camps	Camp Administration	Road Access	Rail Access	Warehouse/ Distribution Points	Clinics	CMR^	Water Supply	Sanitation	Shelter	Security	# of IDP
19	S1	Mercy Corps	Yes	No	1	2	0.21	Sufficient Quantity; Insufficient Quality	Fair	Fair	Fair	23,000
20	S2	OXFAM	Yes	No	3	1	0.3	Sufficient Quantity; Insufficient Quality	Fair	Poor	Poor	17,000
21	K1	Mercy Corps	Yes, Limited	No	1	3	0.2	Sufficient Quantity; Insufficient Quality	Fair	Good	Fair	20,500
22	K2	CARE	Yes	Yes	3	1	0.27	Sufficient Quantity; Insufficient Quality	Poor	Fair	Fair	19,500
23	R1	ICRC	Yes	No	2	1	0.35	Sufficient Quantity; Insufficient Quality	Fair	Poor	Poor	20,000
24	^Crude Mortality Rate in Camp											

**Responding Agency Listing
Office Locations**

A	B	C	D
2	NGO, IO and Donor Headquarters Locations/Facilities		
3			
4	Type of Organisation	Headquarters/Representatives	Sub-Offices
5	UN Agencies, Funds and Programmes		
6	1 United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)	Galasi	Cereni, Maldosa, Folsa, Alur
7	2 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)	Galasi	NA
8	3 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)	Galasi	Maldosa, Alur
9	4 United Nations World Food Programme (WFP)	Galasi	Maroni, Cereni, Maldosa, Corma, Folsa, Alur
10	5 World Health Organization (WHO)	Galasi	NA
11	International Organisations		
12	6 Asian Development Bank (ADB)	Galasi	N/A
13	7 International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)	Galasi	Maroni, Arum, Cereni, Maldosa, Corma, Folsa, Faron, Sureen, and Alur
14	8 International Organization for Migration (IOM)	Galasi	Maroni, Arum, Cereni, Maldosa, Corma, Folsa, Alur
15	9 Islamic Development Bank (IDB)	Galasi	N/A
16	Donor Agencies		
17	10 Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA)	Canadian Embassy - Galasi	Assessment Team/Contracting Team
18	11 Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit Gm	German Embassy - Galasi	Assessment Team/Contracting Team
19	12 European Commission Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO)	French Embassy - Galasi	Assessment Team/Contracting Team
20	13 Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA)	Japanese Embassy - Galasi	Assessment Team/Contracting Team
21	14 Swedish Rescue Services Agency	Swedish Embassy - Galasi	Assessment Team
22	15 Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation	Swiss Embassy - Galasi	Assessment Team/Contracting Team
23	16 United Kingdom Department for International Development	UK Embassy - Galasi	Assessment Team/Contracting Team
24	17 US Agency for International Development (USAID)	US Embassy - Galasi	Assessment Team/Contracting Team
25	International Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs)		
26	18 Action Contre la Faim (ACF)	Galasi	Maroni, Arum, Cereni, Maldosa, Corma, Folsa, Faron, Sureen, and Alur
27	19 Air Serv International	Galasi	Corma, Alur, Folsa, Amsan, Mia
28	20 CARE	Galasi	Maroni, Arum, Cereni, Maldosa, Corma, Folsa, Faron, Sureen, and Alur
29	21 Caritas Austria	Galasi	Maldosa
30	22 Catholic Relief Services (CRS)	Galasi	Maroni, Maldosa
31	23 Church World Service (CWS)	Galasi	Cereni, Folsa, Corma, Alur
32	24 Concern (Ireland)	Galasi	Cereni, Folsa, Corma, Alur
33	25 Croix-Rouge Française	Galasi	Cereni, Folsa, Corma, Alur
34	26 Danish Refugee Council (DRC)	Galasi	Corma, Alur
35	27 Development Works	Galasi	Corma, Alur
36	28 GOAL	Galasi	Amsan, Folsa, Corma, Alur
37	29 Handicap International (HI)	Galasi	Amsan, Folsa, Corma, Alur
38	30 International Medical Corps (IMC)	Galasi	Maroni, Arum, Cereni, Maldosa, Corma, Folsa, Faron, Sureen, and Alur
39	31 International Rescue Committee (IRC)	Galasi	Maroni, Arum, Cereni, Maldosa, Corma, Folsa, Faron, Sureen, and Alur
40	32 Médecins du Monde (MDM)	Galasi	Cereni, Folsa, Corma, Alur
41	33 Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF- France)	Galasi	Arum, Cereni, Maldosa, Corma, Folsa, Faron, Sureen, and Alur
42	34 Mercy Corps (MC)	Galasi	Arum, Cereni, Maldosa, Corma, Folsa, Alur
43	35 Muslim Aid (MA)	Galasi	Cereni, Corma, Alur
44	36 Ockenden International (OI)	Galasi	Maroni, Cereni, Maldosa, Folsa, Alur
45	37 Oxfam	Galasi	Maroni, Arum, Cereni, Maldosa, Corma, Folsa, Faron, Sureen, and Alur
46	38 Peace Winds Japan (PWJ)	Galasi	Cereni, Folsa, Corma, Alur
47	39 Plan	Galasi	Corma, Alur
48	40 Première Urgence (PU)	Galasi	Maldosa, Folsa, Alur
49	41 Save the Children UK	Galasi	Maroni, Arum, Sureen, Cereni, Folsa, Corma, Alur
50	42 Secours Populaire Français	Galasi	Corma, Alur
51	43 Solidarités	Galasi	Alur, Kika, Faron
52	44 Taiwan Buddhist Tzu Chi Foundation	Galasi	N/A
53	45 Welthungerhilfe - German Agro Action (GAA)	Galasi	Arum, Sureen, Alur
54	46 World Vision International (WVI)	Galasi	Cereni, Faron, Sureen, Corma, Alur
55	Human Rights Organisations		
56	47 Human Rights Watch	Galasi	Corma, Alur
57	48 Amnesty International	Galasi	Corma, Alur
58	49 8th Continent Rights Action Network (8RAN)	Galasi	Corma, Alur
59	50 Institute for War and Peace Reporting	Galasi	Corma, Sureen, Alur
60	*See also "UN - NGO at Camps" for Organisations working in DPP Camps		

**Responding Agency Listing
Office Locations**

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q
1																	
2																	
3	1	Type of Organisation	Headquarters/Representatives	Sub-Offices	Location	Location	Location	Location	Location	Location	Location	Location	Location	Location	Location	Location	Location
4	2	United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)	Galasi	Cereni, Maldosa, Folsa, Alur	Cereni	Maldosa	Folsa	Alur									
5	3	United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)	Galasi	NA													Muka
6	4	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)	Galasi	Maldosa, Alur		Maldosa		Alur									
7	5	United Nations World Food Programme (WFP)	Galasi	Maroni, Cereni, Maldosa, Corma, Folsa, Alur	Cereni	Maldosa	Folsa	Alur	Maroni	Corma							
8	6	World Health Organization (WHO)	Galasi	NA													
9	7	Asian Development Bank (ADB)	Galasi	N/A													
10	8	International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)	Galasi	Maroni, Arum, Cereni, Maldosa, Corma, Folsa, Faron, Sureen, and Alur	Cereni	Maldosa	Folsa	Alur	Maroni	Corma	Arum	Faron	Sureen				Muka
11	9	International Organization for Migration (IOM)	Galasi	Maroni, Arum, Cereni, Maldosa, Corma, Folsa, Alur	Cereni	Maldosa	Folsa	Alur	Maroni	Corma							
12	10	Islamic Development Bank (IDB)	Galasi	N/A													
13	11	Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA)	Canadian Embassy - Galasi	Assessment Team/Contracting Team													
14	12	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit Gm	German Embassy - Galasi	Assessment Team/Contracting Team													
15	13	European Commission Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO)	French Embassy - Galasi	Assessment Team/Contracting Team													
16	14	Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA)	Japanese Embassy - Galasi	Assessment Team/Contracting Team													
17	15	Swedish Rescue Services Agency	Swedish Embassy - Galasi	Assessment Team													
18	16	Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation	Swiss Embassy - Galasi	Assessment Team/Contracting Team													
19	17	United Kingdom Department for International Development	UK Embassy - Galasi	Assessment Team/Contracting Team													
20	18	US Agency for International Development (USAID)	US Embassy - Galasi	Assessment Team/Contracting Team													
21	19	Action Contre la Faim (ACF)	Galasi	Maroni, Arum, Cereni, Maldosa, Corma, Folsa, Faron, Sureen, and Alur	Cereni	Maldosa	Folsa	Alur	Maroni	Corma	Arum	Faron	Sureen				Muka
22	20	Air Serv International	Galasi	Corma, Alur, Folsa, Amsan, Mia													
23	21	CARE	Galasi	Maroni, Arum, Cereni, Maldosa, Corma, Folsa, Faron, Sureen, and Alur	Cereni	Maldosa	Folsa	Alur	Maroni	Corma	Arum	Faron	Sureen				Muka
24	22	Caritas Austria	Galasi	Maldosa													
25	23	Catholic Relief Services (CRS)	Galasi	Maroni, Maldosa													
26	24	Church World Service (CWS)	Galasi	Cereni, Folsa, Corma, Alur	Cereni		Folsa	Alur		Corma							
27	25	Concern (Ireland)	Galasi	Cereni, Folsa, Corma, Alur	Cereni		Folsa	Alur		Corma							
28	26	Croix-Rouge Française	Galasi	Cereni, Folsa, Corma, Alur	Cereni		Folsa	Alur		Corma							
29	27	Danish Refugee Council (DRC)	Galasi	Corma, Alur				Alur		Corma							
30	28	Development Works	Galasi	Corma, Alur				Alur		Corma							
31	29	GOAL	Galasi	Amsan, Folsa, Corma, Alur				Folsa	Alur	Corma							
32	30	Handicap International (HI)	Galasi	Amsan, Folsa, Corma, Alur				Folsa	Alur	Corma					Amsan	Amsan	
33	31	International Medical Corps (IMC)	Galasi	Maroni, Arum, Cereni, Maldosa, Corma, Folsa, Faron, Sureen, and Alur	Cereni	Maldosa	Folsa	Alur	Maroni	Corma	Arum	Faron	Sureen				Muka
34	32	International Rescue Committee (IRC)	Galasi	Maroni, Arum, Cereni, Maldosa, Corma, Folsa, Faron, Sureen, and Alur	Cereni	Maldosa	Folsa	Alur	Maroni	Corma	Arum	Faron	Sureen				
35	33	Médecins du Monde (MDM)	Galasi	Cereni, Folsa, Corma, Alur	Cereni		Folsa	Alur		Corma							
36	34	Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF- France)	Galasi	Arum, Cereni, Maldosa, Corma, Folsa, Faron, Sureen, and Alur	Cereni	Maldosa	Folsa	Alur		Corma	Arum	Faron	Sureen				Muka
37	35	Mercy Corps (MC)	Galasi	Arum, Cereni, Maldosa, Corma, Folsa, Alur	Cereni	Maldosa	Folsa	Alur		Corma	Arum						
38	36	Muslim Aid (MA)	Galasi	Cereni, Corma, Alur	Cereni			Alur		Corma							
39	37	Ockenden International (OI)	Galasi	Maroni, Cereni, Maldosa, Folsa, Alur	Cereni	Maldosa	Folsa	Alur	Maroni	Corma	Arum	Faron	Sureen				Muka
40	38	Oxfam	Galasi	Maroni, Arum, Cereni, Maldosa, Corma, Folsa, Faron, Sureen, and Alur	Cereni	Maldosa	Folsa	Alur	Maroni	Corma							
41	39	Peace Winds Japan (PWJ)	Galasi	Cereni, Folsa, Corma, Alur	Cereni		Folsa	Alur		Corma							
42	40	Plan	Galasi	Corma, Alur				Alur		Corma							
43	41	Première Urgence (PU)	Galasi	Maldosa, Folsa, Alur		Maldosa	Folsa	Alur		Corma							
44	42	Save the Children UK	Galasi	Maroni, Arum, Sureen, Cereni, Folsa, Corma, Alur	Cereni		Folsa	Alur	Maroni	Corma				Sureen			
45	43	Secours Populaire Français	Galasi	Corma, Alur				Alur		Corma							
46	44	Solidarités	Galasi	Alur, Kika, Faron				Alur						Faron			Kika
47	45	Taiwan Buddhist Tzu Chi Foundation	Galasi	N/A													
48	46	Welthungerhilfe - German Agro Action (GAA)	Galasi	Arum, Sureen, Alur				Alur			Arum		Sureen				
49	47	World Vision International (WVI)	Galasi	Cereni, Faron, Sureen, Corma, Alur	Cereni			Alur		Corma		Faron	Sureen				
50	48	Human Rights Watch	Galasi	Corma, Alur				Alur		Corma							
51	49	Amnesty International	Galasi	Corma, Alur				Alur		Corma							
52	50	8th Continent Rights Action Network (8RAN)	Galasi	Corma, Alur				Alur		Corma							
53	51	Institute for War and Peace Reporting	Galasi	Corma, Sureen, Alur				Alur		Corma			Sureen				
54	52	Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)	Galasi	Maroni, Arum, Cereni, Maldosa, Corma, Folsa, Alur	Cereni	Maldosa	Folsa	Alur	Maroni	Corma	Arum						
55																	
56																	
57		UN Agencies, Funds and Programmes															
58		International Organisations															
59		Donor Agencies															
60		International Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs)															
61		Human Rights Organisations															

Sector #1

Sector #2

Groups in Maroni

Groups in Alur

International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)	International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
Action Contre la Faim (ACF)	Action Contre la Faim (ACF)
CARE	CARE
International Medical Corps (IMC)	International Medical Corps (IMC)
Oxfam	Oxfam
International Rescue Committee (IRC)	International Rescue Committee (IRC)
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)	Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)
Save the Children UK	Save the Children UK
United Nations World Food Programme (WFP)	United Nations World Food Programme (WFP)
International Organization for Migration (IOM)	International Organization for Migration (IOM)
Ockenden International (OI)	Ockenden International (OI)
Catholic Relief Services (CRS)	Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF- France)
	Mercy Corps (MC)
	World Vision International (WVI)
	Institute for War and Peace Reporting
	Church World Service (CWS)
	Concern (Ireland)
	Croix-Rouge Française
	Médecins du Monde (MDM)
	Muslim Aid (MA)
	Peace Winds Japan (PWJ)
	Air Serv International
	Danish Refugee Council (DRC)
	Development Works
	GOAL
	Handicap International (HI)
	Plan
	Secours Populaire Français
	Human Rights Watch
	Amnesty International
	8th Continent Rights Action Network (8RAN)
	Welthungerhilfe - German Agro Action (GAA)
	Solidarités
	United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)
	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
	Première Urgence (PU)

or #2

Groups in Faron

Groups in Sureen

International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)	International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
Action Contre la Faim (ACF)	Action Contre la Faim (ACF)
CARE	CARE
International Medical Corps (IMC)	International Medical Corps (IMC)
Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF- France)	Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF- France)
Oxfam	Oxfam
International Rescue Committee (IRC)	International Rescue Committee (IRC)
World Vision International (WVI)	World Vision International (WVI)
Solidarités	Save the Children UK
World Vision International (WVI)	Institute for War and Peace Reporting
	Welthungerhilfe - German Agro Action (GAA)
	Action Contre la Faim (ACF)
	CARE

es (UNHCR)

Sector #3

Groups in Corma

Groups in Maldosa

International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)	International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
Action Contre la Faim (ACF)	Action Contre la Faim (ACF)
CARE	CARE
International Medical Corps (IMC)	International Medical Corps (IMC)
Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF- France)	Oxfam
Oxfam	International Rescue Committee (IRC)
International Rescue Committee (IRC)	Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)
Mercy Corps (MC)	United Nations World Food Programme (WFP)
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)	International Organization for Migration (IOM)
World Vision International (WVI)	Ockenden International (OI)
Save the Children UK	Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF- France)
Institute for War and Peace Reporting	Mercy Corps (MC)
United Nations World Food Programme (WFP)	United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)
International Organization for Migration (IOM)	Première Urgence (PU)
Church World Service (CWS)	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
Concern (Ireland)	Catholic Relief Services (CRS)
Croix-Rouge Française	Caritas Austria
Médecins du Monde (MDM)	
Muslim Aid (MA)	
Peace Winds Japan (PWJ)	
Air Serv International	
Danish Refugee Council (DRC)	
Development Works	
GOAL	
Handicap International (HI)	
Plan	
Secours Populaire Français	
Human Rights Watch	
Amnesty International	
8th Continent Rights Action Network (8RAN)	

Groups in Folsa

Groups in Cereni

International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)	International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
Action Contre la Faim (ACF)	Action Contre la Faim (ACF)
CARE	CARE
International Medical Corps (IMC)	International Medical Corps (IMC)
Oxfam	Oxfam
International Rescue Committee (IRC)	International Rescue Committee (IRC)
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)	Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)
Save the Children UK	United Nations World Food Programme (WFP)
United Nations World Food Programme (WFP)	International Organization for Migration (IOM)
International Organization for Migration (IOM)	Ockenden International (OI)
Ockenden International (OI)	Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF- France)
Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF- France)	Mercy Corps (MC)
Mercy Corps (MC)	United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)
Church World Service (CWS)	Save the Children UK
Concern (Ireland)	Church World Service (CWS)
Croix-Rouge Française	Concern (Ireland)
Médecins du Monde (MDM)	Croix-Rouge Française
Peace Winds Japan (PWJ)	Médecins du Monde (MDM)
Air Serv International	Peace Winds Japan (PWJ)
GOAL	World Vision International (WVI)
Handicap International (HI)	Muslim Aid (MA)
United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)	
Première Urgence (PU)	

AGREEMENT TO RESOLVE THE CRISIS IN CARANA

We, the undersigned:

Recognize there is no military solution to the crisis affecting Carana, and that a sustainable peace can only be resolved through political dialogue and a spirit of reconciliation,

Understand the need to take bold decisions,

Agree to immediately cease all hostile activity and further agree to facilitate the deployment of monitors from the United Nations and the CRC,

Hereby agree as follows:

ARTICLE I

- 1.1 A Government of National Reconciliation, fairly representative of the ethnic diversity of Carana, will be set up immediately following the ceasefire to ensure a return to peace and stability. It will be charged with strengthening the independence of the justice system, restoring the administration and public services, restructuring the security forces and rebuilding the country.
- 1.2 The Government of National Reconciliation (GNR) will be led by a consensus Prime Minister who will remain in office until the next Presidential election, in which he will not be able to stand as a candidate.
- 1.3 The GNR will conduct free and fair elections within 12 months of the signing of this agreement.
- 1.4 The GNR will immediately set up a national human rights commission to ensure protection of rights and freedoms in Carana and investigate abuses. The commission will be made up of delegates of all parties and be chaired by a person accepted by all.

ARTICLE II

- 2.1 A ceasefire is hereby established throughout the territory of Carana, between the signatory belligerents. The ceasefire shall enter into force upon signature and the implementation will be effected as soon as possible.

- 2.2. The ceasefire covers all warlike acts by air, land and sea, as well as all acts of sabotage and incitement of ethnic hatred, and requires disengagement of opposing forces as defined hereafter.
- 2.3 The final cessation of hostilities shall enter into force within xxx after the signing of the ceasefire.
- 2.4 Details of the ceasefire and its monitoring by the United Nations are attached to this agreement at Annex1.

ARTICLE III

- 3.1 The GNR will endeavour to facilitate humanitarian operations to aid the victims of the conflict throughout the country. Based on the report of the national human rights commission, mentioned in Article 1.4 above, it will take steps to compensate and rehabilitate victims.

ARTICLE IV

- 4.1 The GNR will establish a national commission to oversee disarmament of former combatants and the restructuring of the military and police forces.
- 4.2 The GNR will, immediately upon taking office, attend to rebuilding an army committed to the values of integrity and professionalism and representative of the ethnic diversity of Carana. The GNR will, as soon as practical begin the restructuring of the defence and security forces, including the police forces and may, for this purpose, receive the counsel of outside advisers.
- 4.3 In order to contribute to restoring the security of persons and property throughout the national territory, the GNR will organise the regrouping and subsequent disarming of all non-government forces. It will ensure that no mercenaries remain within the country's borders.
- 4.4 Those ex-combatants of the CDF, MPC and CISC who wish to be integrated into the new restructured national armed forces may do so provided they meet established criteria, and that the armed forces reflect the geo-political structure of Carana within the established strength, which shall not exceed 10,000.

(Signed)

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF CARANA

FOR THE MPC

FOR THE CISC

(Witnessed by)

FOR THE UNITED NATIONS

FOR THE CONTINENT REGIONAL COALITION

Annex 1

PROVISIONS FOR A CEASEFIRE

- 1 The disengagement of forces shall mean the immediate breaking of tactical contact between the opposing Military Forces of the Parties to this Agreement at places where they are in direct contact by the effective date and time of the Cease-Fire Agreement.
- 2 Where immediate disengagement is not possible, a framework and sequence of disengagement is to be agreed by all Parties through the Joint Commission for the Ceasefire (JCC).
- 3 The immediate disengagement of all military units shall be limited to the effective range of direct fire weapons. Further disengagement to pull all weapons out of range, shall be conducted under the guidance of the JCC.
- 4 The Carana Defence Forces (CDF) will withdraw all armored vehicles and weapons larger than Caliber .50in from Tereni, Koloni, Mahbek and Leppko provinces.
- 5 The resupply of weapons, ammunition or other lethal logistical supplies will cease by the effective date and time of this agreement.
- 6 A complete ban on any mine-laying operations will come into effect by the effective date and time of the Cease-Fire Agreement.
- 7 Any attempt to hinder or prevent operations to remove mines will be considered a breach of the terms of the ceasefire agreement.
- 8 Upon the cease-fire taking effect, all Parties shall provide International Committee of the Red Cross/Red Crescent with relevant information concerning their prisoners of war or persons detained because of the war. They shall subsequently accord every assistance to the ICRC representatives to enable them to visit the prisoners and detainees and verify any details and ascertain their condition and status.
- 9 On the coming into force of the Agreement, the Parties shall release persons detained because of the war or taken hostage within three days of the signing of the Cease-fire Agreement and the ICRC/Red Crescent shall give them all the necessary assistance including relocation to any provinces within Carana or any other country where their security will be guaranteed.
- 10 All domestic and external propaganda between the parties and any other action aimed at inciting ethnic hatred will cease by the effective date and time of the Cease-Fire Agreement.

- 11 All acts of violence against the civilian population will cease by the effective date and time of the Cease-Fire Agreement. This includes acts of revenge; summary executions; torture; harassment; detention and persecution of civilians on the basis of ethnic origin, religious beliefs, or political affiliation; arming of civilians; use of child soldiers; sexual violence; sponsoring or promotion of terrorists or genocidal ideologies.

ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS

- 1 The verification and control of the ceasefire will be overseen by a United Nations mandated mission and will include the establishment of a Joint Ceasefire Commission (JCC) chaired by the UN, and Joint Liaison Teams (JLTs) that will function at national, provincial and local levels.
- 2 The JCC will be composed of appointed representatives of all parties and the UN. It shall be established immediately upon signing of the Peace Agreement.
- 3 All parties will provide details to the JCC giving the strength and locations of their forces. In view of the sensitivity of such information the head of the JCC is to make provision for its appropriate handling. All CDF soldiers and Mouvement Patriotique de Carana (MPC) and Combattants Indépendants du Sud Carana (CISC) members shall be registered.
- 4 The JCC shall be based in Galasi and shall be headed by the UN, which will define its tasks and duties. Rules of procedure will be drafted in consultation with the parties and these will be promulgated through the JCC. The JCC shall report formally to the GNR on a regular basis.
- 5 The JCC will establish the JLTs and make appropriate arrangements for reporting and dealing with issues that are brought to its attention, specifically any issues requiring arbitration between the parties or violations of the ceasefire.
- 6 The JLTs will be composed of representatives of all signatories, and led by officers of the UN. The JLTs will be responsible to the JCC.
- 7 The JLTs will facilitate communication between parties in order to reduce the likelihood of violations of the Ceasefire Agreement and to clarify alleged violations of the agreement. They will thereby assist in building confidence amongst signatories and help create trust in the peace process.

DPKO Assessment and Planning Directive

Planning for a United Nations Peacekeeping Operation in Carana

SITUATION

- The conflict in Carana has reached a stalemate in which the Government can no longer control significant portions of the country and increasingly armed and extremist elements have stepped in to fill the vacuum. In the west, an alternative structure is evolving in areas controlled by the MPC while the south is increasingly fragmented, lacking any structure and reverting to control by individual local leaders splintering away from the CISC. No single entity is capable of achieving a successful military outcome to the conflict, resources are tight, and the ethnic and religious tensions have been increasingly evident with atrocities being committed in a number of areas.
- The worst case scenario would see the current stalemate sliding into a state of general anarchy, or see a *de facto* breakup of the country under individual factions; while the latter may be a viable option in the eyes of the MPC, it is not so in CISC areas, which would witness a further deterioration of law and order. The just-concluded Kalari peace agreement offers the only real option for sustainable peace, and is an essential precursor to any long-term ability to address the root causes of the conflict.
- The CRC has played a significant role in moving the peace process forward including its efforts to promote the Kalari peace agreement. The functions of its light observer mission (CRCAC) will be folded into the UN peacekeeping operation and most of the observers will be re-designated to participate in this new mission. So long as the French force 'Operation Intrepide' remains in Southern Carana, the peacekeeping operation will need to establish clear lines of cooperation and liaison.
- Key aspects of the new agreement include:
 - The establishment of a Government of National Reconciliation;
 - Commitment to the longer term establishment of a democratically elected government;
 - Mechanisms for disengagement, implementation and monitoring of a ceasefire;
 - Confidence building measures, including the release of prisoners;
 - Respect for human rights;
 - Disarmament and demobilization of armed groups;
 - Restructured military police and intelligence capacities.

United Nations Security Council Resolution xxx of 3 June xxxx confirmed the Council's readiness to establish a UN peacekeeping operation to support the implementation of the Kalari Agreement and a long-term political settlement.

- DPKO has assumed lead responsibility for planning of the UN operation and an Integrated Task Force (ITF) has been established.
- The operational imperative is to ensure that the UN system is prepared to act quickly and deploy an integrated mission to support the new Kalari agreement. The conditions to deploy are generally good but any delay will create an opportunity for disaffected groups to undermine the process and result in a renewed cycle of violence with consequences both for the long-term political situation and the immediate humanitarian problem.
- The plan produced under DPKO's leadership must synchronize the immediate stabilization objectives within the overall framework of recovery, reconstruction and development, which is essential for long term stability in Carana.

STRATEGIC DIRECTION

- The strategic direction, as derived from the Secretary-General and the Security Council, will be as follows:

“The objective of the United Nations should be to contribute to the creation of an environment conducive to national reconciliation, lasting peace and stability in a united Carana, where human rights are respected, the protection of all citizens is assured and in which internally displaced persons and refugees can return home in safety and dignity; and to contribute to the protection of civilians at risk.”
- This constitutes the UN system's objective for Carana, the achievement of which will include:
 - Supporting political dialogue at national and sub-national levels to foster an inclusive and viable peace agreement and its implementation;
 - Supporting security and stabilization in key contested areas; and
 - Completing the establishment and operationalization of full Mission capacity in key areas.

STAKEHOLDERS

- Achieving the objective will require a concerted effort by all stakeholders. At HQ, the full involvement of the agencies, funds and programs in the work of the ITF is critical from the outset.
- In the field, it is essential to ensure that:
 - The Government of National Reconciliation is included and that its responsibilities are clearly understood by all parties;
 - The CRC remains engaged as a full partner in the process;
 - Individual Member States, international and regional organizations and donors, who are prepared to support the reconstruction effort, are encouraged to do so, and engaged at an early stage.

ASSUMPTIONS

- The cooperation of the Government of National Reconciliation is required for meaningful planning to take place, and that all parties agree not to put obstacles in the way of a UN deployment.
- Other assumptions:
 - That military and police personnel required for a possible United Nations operation in Carana will be forthcoming from troop and police contributing countries, and will be deployed as per SCR XXX.
 - That only those tasks that are clearly indicated by this directive will be included in the planning; any additional tasks should be the subject of a separate recommendation and approved by DPKO.
 - That the Kalari peace agreement will be the basis for meaningful change in Carana and that it will receive full and timely international support.
 - That the humanitarian operation currently taking place in Carana will continue.
 - That the CRC will support UN efforts to ensure that Carana's neighbours do not interfere in the internal affairs of Carana.

CRITERIA FOR SUCCESS

- The following targets represent what we need to achieve:
 - Deployment of a Technical Assessment Mission within 14 days of the signing of a peace agreement;
 - Deployment of a peacekeeping mission within 90 days of a Security Council resolution;
 - Stabilisation of the current humanitarian crisis within six months from the adoption of a Security Council resolution. Stabilisation will occur when it is no longer necessary to provide emergency relief;
 - Cessation of hostilities as specified by the Kalari peace agreement;
 - Implementation of the terms of the peace agreement as specified by that agreement;
 - Commencement of a programme of disarmament and demobilization of armed groups within three months of the peace agreement, and

completion within 12 months;

- Completion of planning for support to an election process within 12 months from the adoption of a Security Council resolution;
- Return of all IDPs and refugees within two years, and provision for displaced voters to participate in the election should it occur before they are able to return.

CONSTRAINTS

- The general state of the Caranian infrastructure presents significant operational and logistical challenges and road movement can become a major problem in the rainy season, particularly in the more remote parts of the country; this will require that the movement of goods and personnel be carried out by air, particularly by helicopter at certain times of the year.
- The timeline that has been established by the Kalari peace agreement envisages elections within 12 months; this will place us and the Government of National Reconciliation under significant pressure. On one hand we will need to have our plans to support the electoral process in place in good time, and on the other we must be prepared for a contingency should the date for the elections slip.
- The scenario described in the previous point is likely to be complicated because the Government of National Reconciliation will initially lack the capability to undertake its own responsibilities, both in preparing for elections and also potentially in other areas such as disarmament and security sector reform.

PROCESS

- Planning for the deployment of the peacekeeping operation will be led from United Nations Headquarters, under the direction of the Carana Planning Team that has been established for this purpose.
- The process will be guided by the Integrated Assessment and Planning process (IAP), whose major benchmarks and outputs include:
 - The Mission Concept and the Integrated Strategic Framework (ISF);
 - The Secretary-General's Report to the Security Council;
 - Security Council resolutions;
 - Establishment of an Integrated Mission Headquarters;
 - Assumption of operational planning responsibilities by the Mission HQ; and
 - Validation and endorsement of the Mission Concept.

TIMELINE

- ☐ Draft Mission Plan: one week prior to technical assessment mission,
- ☐ Technical Assessment Mission: Within 21 days of the signing of a peace agreement,
- ☐ Secretary-General submits a report to the Security Council: three weeks after return of technical assessment mission,
- ☐ Mission Concept: 21 days after Secretary-General's report to Security Council
- ☐ Integrated Strategic Framework: 100 days after the establishment of the mission,
- ☐ Establishment of the mission headquarters, augmented by the temporary deployment of the ITF within five weeks of the Security Council resolution.

RESPONSIBILITIES & DEADLINES

DPKO / ITF:

- ☐ The head of the Carana Planning Team and DPKO chair of the ITF is responsible to the USG and is to lead all UN planning activities during the foundation and operational planning phases until a USG Directive to the SRSG is issued to guide an integrated peace support operation in Carana. S/he is also responsible for ensuring the substantive integration of all relevant dimensions of UN system involvement.
- ☐ The DPKO chair of the ITF is to provide the USG with an initial presentation for the Security Council on options for an integrated peace support operation in Carana immediately on the return of the technical assessment mission.
- ☐ S/he is to lead a technical assessment mission to Carana at the earliest opportunity.
- ☐ S/he is to produce recommendations for the Secretary-General on the structure, size and concept of an integrated peace support operation in Carana to the Security Council within 21 days of return from the technical assessment, or as directed by the USG.
- ☐ S/he is to present a final draft for an integrated peace support operation in Carana within 28 days of return from the technical assessment mission, or as directed by the USG.
- ☐ She/he is to ensure that throughout the planning there is full compliance with Decision No. 2008/24 of the Policy Committee of 26 October 2008 on human rights in integrated missions.

SRSG

- Once a SRSG has been appointed and the USG DPKO has issued a directive, s/he will assume the lead for planning for the mission in Carana.

INTEGRATION OF ALL UN EFFORTS IN CARANA

- A critical function of the Mission Concept is to integrate the work of all Mission components behind clearly-established mission-wide priorities to ensure maximum coherence and unity of effort. Individual components of the Mission - substantive, military, police and support - will be expected to align their respective Concepts of Operation on the basis of the Mission Concept.
- The UNCT will participate actively in, and contribute to, the planning process in order to ensure proper alignment, coordination and consistency in the development of the UN system-wide response. This involvement is in addition to that of the UNDG and ECHA planning capacities and individual agencies represented on the IMTF.
- A comprehensive strategic communication strategy will be developed in consultation with UN partners as soon as possible. This strategy should be implemented well in advance of the UN mission assuming responsibility. The strategy will have the objective of promoting an understanding among local communities, the parties to the peace process and the public at large, with regard to the role of a United Nations peacekeeping operation in Carana.

**ANNEX A TO
AUTHORIZED RULES OF ENGAGEMENT
FOR UNAC**

Security Council Resolution

1. The Security Council, by its Resolution 1544 (20xx) decided to establish a United Nations Assistance Mission Carana (UNAC) with effect from 22 M+3 20xx. The successful completion of the UNAC mission will result in Carana achieving peace and security. The Security Council thereupon decided to establish by its Resolution 1544 (20xx), a United Nations Assistance Mission in Carana (UNAC) which is mandated to establish UNAC, for a period of 6 months and further decides that UNAC will consist of up to 6,800 United Nations military personnel, including up to 200 military observers and 160 staff officers, and up to 1250 United Nations police officers including formed police units to assist in the maintenance of law and order throughout Carana, and the appropriate civilian component.

2. The UN Security Council by its Resolution 1544 (20xx) appointment by the Secretary-General of his Special Representative for Carana to direct the operations of UNAC and coordinate all United Nations activities in Carana.

UNAC Mandate

3. Under the provisions of Security Council Resolution 1544 (20xx), the UNAC mandate consists of the following elements:
- a. to observe and monitor the implementation of the ceasefire agreement and investigate violations of the ceasefire;
 - b. to establish and maintain continuous liaison with the field headquarters of all parties military forces;
 - c. to develop, as soon as possible, preferably within 30 days of the adoption of the resolution, in cooperation with relevant international financial institutions, international development organizations, and donor nations, an action plan for the overall implementation of a voluntary disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and repatriation (DDRR) programme for all armed parties; with particular attention to the special needs of child combatants and women; and addressing the inclusion of non-Carana combatants;

- d. to carry out voluntary disarmament and to collect and destroy weapons and ammunition as part of an organized DDRR programme;
- e. to provide security at key government installations, in particular ports, airports and other vital infrastructure.

UNAC Objectives

4. To implement its mandate UNAC has the objective of giving full effect to the following four Programmes:

- a. Protection of United Nations' Staff, facilities and Civilians,
- b. Support for Humanitarian and Human Rights Assistance,
- c. Support for Security reform, and
- d. Support for Implementation of the Peace Process.

5. Protection of United Nations' Staff, facilities and Civilians:

- a. to protect United Nations personnel, facilities, installations and equipment, ensure the security and freedom of movement of its personnel and, without prejudice to the efforts of the government, to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, within their capabilities;

6. Support for Humanitarian and Human Rights Assistance:

- a. to facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance, including by helping to establish the necessary security conditions;
- b. to monitor the human rights situation, to contribute towards international efforts to protect and promote human rights in Carana, with particular attention to vulnerable groups including refugees, returning refugees and internally displaced persons, abductees, women, children and demobilized child soldiers, as well as provide human rights technical assistance as needed in close cooperation with other United Nations agencies, related organizations,

government organizations and non-governmental organizations;

- c. to ensure an adequate human rights presence, capacity and expertise within UNAC to carry out human rights promotion, protection, and monitoring activities;
7. Support for Security reform:
- a. to assist the new Carana government in monitoring and restructuring of the police force of Carana, consistent with democratic policing and international standards, to develop a civilian police training programme, and to otherwise assist in the training of civilian police in cooperation with interested organizations and interested States;
 - b. to assist the new Carana government in the formation of a new and restructured Carana military in cooperation with international organizations and interested States;
8. Support for Implementation of the Peace Process:
- a. to assist the new Carana government in conjunction with other international partners, in reestablishment of national authority throughout the country, including the establishment of a functioning administrative structure at both national and local level;
 - b. to assist the new Carana government in restoring proper administration of natural resources;
 - c. to assist the new Carana government in preparing for national elections scheduled for no later than end 20xx;
 - d. to assist the new Carana government in conjunction with other international partners in developing a strategy to consolidate governmental institutions, including a national legal framework and judicial and correctional institutions;
9. Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, the Security Council, by its Resolution 1544 (20xx), authorized UNAC, for the duration of its

mandate, to fulfill its tasks, and decided to review this issue and all other aspects of UNAC'S mandate after 6 months.

SPECIFIC RULES OF ENGAGEMENT FOR UNAC

10. The following ROE have been authorized for use by UN Security Force (UNSF) in UNAC:

Rule 1 — Use of Force

Rule No 1.1 Use of force, up to and including deadly force, to defend oneself and other UN personnel against a hostile act or a hostile intent, is authorized.

Rule No 1.2 Use of force, up to and including deadly force, to defend other international personnel against a hostile act or a hostile intent, is authorized.

Rule No 1.3 Use of force, up to and including deadly force, to resist armed attempts to abduct or detain oneself and other UN personnel, is authorized.

Rule No 1.4 Use of force, up to and including deadly force, to resist armed attempts to abduct or detain other international personnel is authorized.

Rule No 1.5 Use of force, up to and including deadly force, to protect United Nations installations, areas or goods designated by the SRSG in consultation with the Force Commander, against a hostile act, is authorized.

Rule No 1.6 Use of force, up to and including deadly force, to protect key installations, areas or goods designated by the SRSG in consultation with the Force Commander, against a hostile act is authorized.

Rule No 1.8 Use of force up to and including deadly force, in order to protect civilians under **immediate** threat of physical violence, is authorized.

Rule No 1.9 Use of force (not including the use of deadly force) to prevent the escape of any apprehended or detained person, pending hand-over to appropriate civilian authorities, is authorized. In case of necessity to act in self-defence, use of force, up to and including deadly force, is authorized.

Rule No 1.10 Use of force, up to and including deadly force is authorized:

- a. In order to protect the security of UNAC personnel; and
- b. Against any individual and/or group who limits or intends to limit the freedom of movement of UNAC personnel.

Rule No 1.11 Use of force up to and including deadly force, to resist armed/forceful attempts to prevent UNAC personnel from discharging their duties is authorized.

Rule 2 — Use of Weapon Systems

Rule No 2.1 Use of explosives in order to destroy weapons, ammunition, mines and unexploded ordnance, in the course of the disarmament exercise, is authorized.

Rule No 2.2 Indiscriminate pointing of weapons in the direction of any person is prohibited.

Rule No 2.3 Firing of weapons other than for organized training and as authorized in these ROE, is prohibited.

Rule No 2.4 Firing of warning shots is authorized.

Rule No 2.5 Use of riot control equipment and agents is authorized.

Rule No 2.6 Use of lasers for survey, range finding and targeting is authorized.

Rule No 2.7 Use of Grenades and Grenade 40 mm HE is authorized only when necessary for immediate self defence or the immediate defence of others authorized to be defended under these ROE against a hostile act or demonstration of hostile intent.

Rule 3 — Authority to Carry Weapons

Rule No 3.1 Carriage of loaded personal weapons is authorized.

Rule No 3.2 Overt carriage by individuals of hand-held support weapons such as machine guns, light mortars and hand held anti-tank weapons, is authorized.

Rule No 3.3 Deployment and carriage of weapons on or in vehicles, aircraft and vessels is authorized.

Rule 4 — Authority to Detain, Search and Disarm

Rule No 4.1 Detention of individuals or groups who commit a hostile act or demonstrate a hostile intent against oneself, one's unit or UN personnel is authorized.

Rule No 4.2 Detention of individuals or groups who commit a hostile act or demonstrate a hostile intent against other international personnel is authorized.

Rule No 4.3 Detention of individuals or groups who commit a hostile act or demonstrate hostile intent against any civilian, or against installations and areas or goods designated by the SRSG in consultation with the Force Commander is authorized.

Rule No 4.4 Searching of detained persons for weapons, ammunition and explosives, is authorized.

Rule No 4.5 Disarming of armed individuals or groups, when so directed by the Force Commander, is authorized.

Rule No 4.6 In the absence of police authority, warning and questioning of persons is authorized if those persons are known to be obstructing or otherwise interfering with the UNAC mission, or are believed, on reasonable grounds to be so doing.

Rule No 4.7 In the absence of police authority, detention and search of persons is authorized if those persons are known to be obstructing or otherwise interfering with the UNAC mission or are believed on reasonable grounds to be so doing.

Rule 5 — Reaction to Civil Action or Unrest

Rule No 5.1 In the absence of police authority, detention of any person who commits or threatens to commit a crime, is authorized.

Rule No 5.2 In the absence of police authority, warning and questioning of suspicious person or persons obstructing or otherwise interfering with the UNAC mission are authorized.

Rule No 5.3 In the absence of police authority, detention and search of suspicious person or persons obstructing or otherwise interfering with the UNAC mission are authorized.

Rule No 5.4 In the absence of police authority, security operations such as roadblocks, barriers, cordon and search and prohibition of entry, which may disrupt the normal pattern of civilian life, are permitted to the extent necessary for mission accomplishment.

CARANA – MISSION PLANNING MATRIX

Objective 1: Reestablishment of Peace and Security

Key Assumptions:

- 1 All parties (warring factions) abide by the Kalari Peace agreement.
- 2 All elements of UNAC are well established in their respective locations.
- 3 Free movement of UN personnel is secured.

Required Output	Activity	Timeframe	Success Criteria	Resources	Responsibility	Comment
1. Keep warring factions are kept at a distance amongst them and not getting closer to each other	UN military contingents, observers and police will be deployed in areas including Lisbo, Akkabar, Maldosa, Lora, Perkes, visiting positions of all parties.	By September 22, all factions lay down their arms	No major confrontations would occur	Two infantry brigades deployed in each sector with 20 military observers	UNAC	Forces assets and efforts will be initially concentrated on more difficult situations in the Western and Southern parts of Carana where MPC and ICSC elements together with organized criminal groups will be the biggest challenge.
2. Establish and maintain continuous liaison with the filed headquarters of all parties' military forces	UN military observers and Grade 1 staff officers from sector headquarters will meet the warring factions in their respective areas	Immediately put into effective from September 22 to November 22	All elements of warring factions maintain cease-fire and remain in their respective areas	Infantry Brigades and military observers	UNAC Force Commander Sector Headquarters	

3. Implement Voluntary DDR programme for all warring parties	1. DDR cell will be established Joint UN	Immediately	95% of weapons belonging to warring factions are desposed	UNAC	Force Commander	DDR process will be fully integrated into planning of Objective 4
	2. Joint technical committee will be formed to that end.	Immediately		UNAC	DSRSG	
	3. Ex-combatants will be reintegrated into the army provided that they meet standard criteria.	Within 6 months		UNDP	UNDP together with UNAC	
4. Keep stable relations with warring factions on a number of issues	Continued negotiations with the warring factions	Launching immediately and continue until the end of the mandate	---Maintenance of complete ceasefire ---No Violation of the Agreement ---Calm maintained	---UN military personnel ---UN Police ---Military Observers	---SRSG ---Force Commander ---Police Commissioner	
5.1 Establish the foundation for Force Projection	1. Build deployment bases with appropriate C4I network for rest of deployment of military forces	M+120	Complete the establishment of force receiving plan	UNCT	UNCT	
	2. Secure the seairlift/airlift installations to ensure the freedom of movement and	M+60	Project the appropriate armed troops to secure the Airport (Galasi & Corma), Seaport	UNCT/PDT	FC	

	logistics/supply requirement		(Galasi & Cereni & Maldosa) for exclusive use of UN			
	3. Establish ground transportation network between key stations	M+60	Establish key logistics supply sites and ensure the free transit between each stations	UNAC	FC	
5.2 Establish Intelligence activities	1. Conduct Air Patrol and reconnaissance	M+180	Using helicopters and UNV for intelligence operations	UNAC	FC	
	2. Conduct Ground Patrol and Reconnaissance	M+60 (M+120)	Collecting the intelligence and warning the uncontrolled armed group that UN patrol troops monitoring their activities	UNAC	FC	
5.3 Protect High Value Facilities	1. Secure the Government Installations	M+60 (M+120)	Project security forces to designated important facilities to protect them	UNAC	FC Sector/Contingent Commanders	
	2. Secure the UN Facilities	M+60 (M+120)	Project security forces to designated important facilities to protect them	UNAC	FC Sector/Contingent Commanders	
	3. Protect assigned important facilities with	M+60 (M+120)	Project security forces to designated important	UNAC	FC Sector/Contingent Commanders	

Key Assumptions: ---Kalari Peace Agreement will not be broken by either party						
Required Output	Activity	Timeframe	Success Criteria	Resources	Responsibility	Comment
1 Reestablish the national authority throughout the country	Administrative assistance to each ministry and local entities by dispatching administrative advisers in different areas	Immediately	Establishment of functional administration	Funding by UN agencies and international donors	UNAC Civil Affairs Office UNDP	Appropriate coordination is necessary amongst donors and UN agencies
2 Create a functional legal / judicial systems	1. Assessing Carana Criminal Justice System 2. Technical assistance for establishment of a national legal framework 3. Recruit and training of judges, prosecutors, other needed officials in judicial system 4. Establishment of several correctional institutions.	Within 3 months Within 6 months Within 9 months Within 12 months	1. Adoption of a national legal framework 2. Successful functioning of judicial systems 3. Public Prosecutor and its office, Court and judges, Corrections and its officers, organization are reformed and their capacity is developed.	Funding by UNDP, UNODC, UNAFEI and international donors	Carana GNR supported by Judiciary and Corrections Office in UNAC	Coordination among donors is critical Competent existing officers are considered for continuing for development training session,
3 Establish National Counter Corruption	1. Adoption of necessary laws & regulations	Within 6 months	National Counter Corruption Commission and its office are	Funding by UNDP, UNODC and UNAFEI	UNAC and other CJ Experts	

Agency/Commission	2. Establish organization with necessary: Personnel/staff Facility	Within 1 year	established			
4 Nurturing an environment conducive to holding elections	1. Raising awareness amongst the people on electoral system 2. Providing support for formation of electoral committee 3. Other necessary preparations for elections	Start immediately and complete by June 2007 Within 6 months Within 12 months	Holding of elections at an appropriate timing	Funding by UN DPA and UNDP in addition to international donors	Electoral Assistance Team dispatched by DPA	Targeting at holding elections as soon as a relatively stable environment is secured, preferably toward the end of 12 months. However, timing of national elections is to be determined according to the progress in other areas of the mission

Objective 3: Reestablishment of Rule of Laws including Human Rights

Key Assumptions:

- 1. Agreement on the International Police Task Force is in place (Sovereignty & Legitimacy (jurisdiction) Issue);**
- 2. Criminal Code or Interim Criminal Laws exists.**
- 3. Government of National Reconciliation give full and unlimited access to the current police force.**
- 4. Supporting and relevant laws are already in place.**
- 5. Local Resource Person, Police Experts and necessary Contact Person are available to provide assistance and involvements.**
- 6. UNAC activities progresses as per the time-lines given in the Security Council Resolution 1544**

Required Output	Activity	Timeframe	Success Criteria	Resources	Responsibility	Comment
1 Set up the structure and system for UN Police Administration and Operation	Establish Rules & Regulations Coordinating with Carana PD Contracting with relevant unit Budgeting Allocation	Within the 1 st week and onward	UN Police HQ and Regional HQ, Police Station and Sub-stations are established. Functional & operational UN Police The Command, Control, Communication and Information Center (C3I) system & facilities is established and functioning	DMS – Budget Carana PD Country Team Donation	UN Police Commission UNODC and Country Team Donor Countries	Use what is provided. Repair what is broken. Build/acquire what is needed. Maintenance and continuous develop on what we have.
2 Provide police service through out the country.	Staffing UN Police HQ Deploying UN Police to staff Regional HQ, Stations and Sub-stations	After the 1 st week and onward	All police units at every level are staff (at least to the minimum operable level)	DMS – Budget Carana PD Country Team Donations	UN Police Commission Regional Com. Station Chief UNODC and Country Team Donor Countries	Use what is provided. Repair what is broken. Build/acquire what is needed. Maintenance and continuous develop on what we have.
3 Assess Carana PD	Assess CPD's current capacity, capability and	Within 1 month	Assessment Report: (Where we are; what is	DMS - Budget	Assessment Team	Assistance from Local Resource persons

	needs		needed to be where we want to be)			
4 Build Internationally acceptable police officers	Reform Police Personnel System: -Recruiting & Selection -Training -Salary, Benefits, Rewarding -Discipline -Termination	Within 3 month Within 6 month	100 Police Officers with basic skills and professionalism	DMS – Budget UNODC and Country Team Donor Countries	Carana PD – Main Training Team – Sub Advisory Group – Sub	Competent existing police officer will be considered for continuing with the Force (on a case by case basis) and given priority for a short.(1 mth) separate-retaining course
5 Provide necessary Tools, Equipments and Vehicles	Budgeting Allocation Logistics	After 1 month onward	New tools, Equipments and Vehicle	Carana PD Country Team Donation	Carana PD UNODC and Country Team Donor Countries	Capacity Bldg. Repair what's broke. Maintenance what's having.. Find/Get what's needed.
6 Provide necessary facilities including - Station house - Holding Cells	Budgeting Allocation Coordinating/ Contracting with relevant unit	After 1 month onward	Functional & operational police facilities	Carana PD Country Team Donation	Carana PD UNODC and Country Team Donor Countries	Capacity Bldg. Repair what break. Maintenance what have Build what need.
7 Reform and Restructure Carana PD	Assess and Evaluate the Org. Structure of Carana PD Re-engineer the Police organization structure and system	6 months 1 year	Carana PD is restructured of its organization & work system	DMS – Budget Country Team Donation	Assessment Team Resource Person Carana Intrm. Government Advisory Group Police Experts Outside Experts	Institutional Capacity Bldg. Initiative

8 Reform and Restructure Carana Defense Forces (CDF) composed of 10,000 military personnel	1. Establishing Military Academy 2. Training of former combatants at Recruit Training Centres 3. Reconstructionn of Camps, Bases, and other Installations	By August 2007	Army, Navy and Air Force Chiefs take over the stock of the forces and chain of command established	1. Personnel from existing defense forces and rebel groups 2. Military hardwares from friendly states	UN Country Team of UNAC Donor Agencies Friendly States GNR Peace Building Commission	Restructuring of CDF will be progressing simultaneously with other tasks and activities of UNAC
9 Strengthening human rights, especially those of women and children	Strengthen law enforcement with a particular attention to women and children	Immediately		UNDP OCHA	Police Commissioner	

Objective 4: Creating a sustainable environment for the people of Carana

Key Assumptions:

---Provision of humanitarian assistance to all IDP and refugee camps is sufficiently secured.

---Donors and other stakeholders in Carana continue to commit to a sustainable development of the country.

Required Output	Activity	Timeframe	Success Criteria	Resources	Responsibility	Comment
1. Improve living condition of 11 IDP and refugee camps in accordance with UN standards through humanitarian assistance	1. UN country team and representatives of donors visit IDP and refugee camps for a fact-finding mission for needs assessment	Immediately	Situation in camps and basic needs for their living are identified properly	Funding by UNDP, WFP UNHCR, WHO and other UN agencies ICRC/IFRC International donors NGOs	DSRSG and UN country team	CAP should be introduced in due course
	2. Joint Coordination Committee is established for better coordination amongst stakeholders	Within one month	Better coordination amongst UN agencies and donors	CERF may be utilized accordingly		
	3. Initial start-up for emergency relief for a selected locations of IDP and refugees camps	Within one month				
	4. Engagement of local and international media on the suffering of IDPs and refugees		Sufficient coverage in the media on the issue			Security is secured for the transport of humanitarian aids

2. Render support for the capacity building of IDPs and refugees in preparation for their return to home	1. Capacity-building programme for IDPs and refugees	Within 3 months	IDPs and refugees acquire sufficient capacity to reestablish their life	Funding by UNHCR, IOM, UNDP and other UN Agencies and donors	UN Country Team UNHCR, IOM, UNDP and other UN Agencies	Security should be established before their return to homes
	2. Assistance to their relocation	Within 12 months				
3. Launch initial preparation for recovery and sustainable development	1. Establishment of joint coordination committee to better prepare for peace-building	Within 3 months	Sufficient amount of assistance is pledged and committed by international donors	Funding by UNDP and other UN agencies World Bank International donors	UN Country Team UNDP and other UN agencies World Bank International donors	
	2. Active engagement of donors and other stakeholders for the recovery of Carana through assisting in holding of donor conference	Within 3 months				
	3. Launching quick impact projects	Within 3 months				

4 Secure funding for long-term sustainable development including also better management of natural resources	<p>1 Dispatch of experts in areas of mining to assist Carana GNR for better management of natural resources</p> <p>2 Design a new strategy for sustainable development of Carana</p> <p>3 Launching of donor conference based on a new strategy</p>	Within 3 months		Funding by World Bank	World Bank + UN Country Team as necessary	World Bank will take lead on sustainable development including management of natural resources
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Other measures necessary for Mission Support:						
Key Assumptions: negotiation with TCC/PCC for the conclusion of MOU (List of support item) is in progress.						
Required Output	Activity	Timeframe	Success Criteria	Resources	Responsibility	Comment
1 Budget approval	Submit the budget request	ASAP	Request has been approved in order to execute Operation plan		DMS	
2 Conclude MOU with TCC/PCC	Negotiate the logistics plan and supply items with TCC/PCC	ASAP	Complete coordination with TCC/PCC, determining the detail logistics/support items and reinvestment		SRSG/DMS/CT	
3 Establish robust logistics mechanism	1. provide sealift/airlift capability for military operations and logistics requirement	Within 6 months after projection started	Complete contract with commercial company to schedule the logistics sealift/airlift, or negotiate with TCC to provide strategic transportation	Charter (TCC)	DMS	
	2. Provide land transportation for military logistics/supply requirement, and humanitarian assistance	Within 6 months after projection started	Establish ground transportation for distribution of supply items	UNAC	DMS	

UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION IN CARANA (UNAC)

CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

References:

- A. Security Council **Resolution SC/1544 dated xx/xx/xxxx.**
- B. Kalari Treaty signed on **xxxxxxx.**
- C. UN Integrated Strategy on Carana (not attached)
- D. Carana Planning Maps

STATUS

1. This Concept of Operations (ConOps) is designed to outline the overall method of UN Peacekeeping in Carana. Follow-on detailed plans are the responsibility of the Force Commander.

CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS REVIEW

2. Prior to adoption of this ConOps, a UN Multi-disciplinary Assessment Mission will deploy to Carana to confirm the concept's practicality. Arising from this, the ConOps will be subject to review. However, due to insecurity that exists in Carana, a one-time assessment mission will not be able to physically cover the whole of Carana. In this regard, assessments/reconnaissance and ConOps review will be phased and will depend on security being achieved in earmarked areas.

INTRODUCTION

3. Following the signing of the Kalari Peace Agreement by the Government of Carana (GOC), MPC (Mouvement Patriotique de Carana) and ICSC (Independent Combatants du Sud Carana), stage was set for the restoration of lasting peace and stability in Carana. Given the regional effect that the conflict in Carana has and the need to maintain regional peace and stability, the International Community has identified the need to actively support the Caranian peace effort. Lack of active participation will result in a protracted conflict that will exacerbate the humanitarian crisis facing Carana. Given the urgent need to have sufficient and capable military presence on the ground in order to effectively support implementation of the Kalari Treaty, the Security Council has authorised a UN Peacekeeping Force to deploy not later than (NLT) **<180 days after the SCR date>.**

ASSUMPTIONS

4. In preparing this ConOps, the following assumptions were made:
 - a. GoC (PDC), MPC and CISC will respect the Kalari Treaty and observe a total cessation of hostilities and provide information on their forces.
 - b. GoC will secure airports and seaports and create soft landing conditions for the UN Peacekeeping Force.
 - c. The parties in Carana will establish a Government of National Reconciliation (GNR).
 - d. Carana's neighbours would respect its territorial integrity and sovereignty.
 - e. The International Community will continue its support and commitment to the achievement of the desired end-state – lasting peace and stability in Carana.
5. Critical Information Requirements.
 - a. Locations, size and intent of the warring parties.

MISSION STATEMENT

6. UNAC will deploy its approved resources in Carana and commence operations **ASAP** to establish the conditions under which all parties in Carana observe the terms of the Kalari Treaty, and provide support to the GNR in order to support the process that will lead to the restoration of stability and the installation of a democratically elected Government.

GENERAL OUTLINE

7. UNAC will use three-folded approach which includes political, security and humanitarian aspects to support the Carana peace process to achieve lasting peace and stability. Together with co-ordinated wider political and economic engagement, UN efforts will ensure cessation of hostilities and compliance with the Kalari Treaty. Physical deployment to or domination of strategic/vital areas will be essential. In so doing, UNAC will ensure that all lines of communication remain open for the delivery of the much-needed humanitarian relief. Protection of important Government infrastructure, aid convoys and UN international staff and aid workers will assist in the creation of a path to lasting peace and stability. **In addition, UNAC Forces will ensure that civilians under threat of violence are protected.** UN support for the peace process will be closely linked to a convincing information campaign along with a carefully co-ordinated humanitarian and human rights programme to lay the foundation for a meaningful and

all-inclusive advance on the path to lasting peace and stability. A credible and loyal Carana security sector will be vital for the country's future. Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) under the management of the National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (NCDDR), will be fundamental in creating space leading to lasting peace and stability. The UN Peacekeeping Force will actively support NCDDR in disarming and demobilising the warring parties. The UN, where possible, will support the restructuring of the security sector that will follow disarmament and demobilisation. While the restructuring of the CDF will be under bilateral arrangements between the GNR and other partners, the UN will be actively involved - through UNPOL (UN Police) – in enhancing the present capacity and subsequent restructuring of the Carana National Police. UN support to the peace process should culminate in the holding of democratic elections that should see the eventual withdrawal of the UN Force.

8. Modus Operandi. This whole concept aims to immediately defuse tensions in Carana by deploying to areas that are currently experiencing hostilities. Thereafter, attention focuses on areas of UN military interest along the international borders of Carana borderline and finally on the coastal areas. To enhance command and control, the theatre of operations will be divided in three sectors. Each sector will be of Sector strength with full combat support compliments. Force HQ will be in Galasi. Map attached as Annex 'B' illustrates the Force layout and sector structures. Combat air support will be centralised and will be placed under the control of the Force Commander in Galasi Airport. The Force Commander will maintain at his command a capable air-mobile reserve with a Special Forces company and will ensure that each Sector maintains a quick reaction capability at all times by establishing dedicated quick reaction forces (QRFs). As eyes and ears of the Force Commander and Sector Commanders, UN Military Observers (UNMO) will be deployed with elements at Force HQ and all Sectors. They will establish team sites in all the Sectors and will support the disarmament and demobilisation of combatants, and report all activities affecting the ceasefire, the Kalari Treaty and all other details deemed essential for the smooth conduct of UN Operations. Their inputs will enhance the Force Commander's and Sector Commanders' planning capabilities.

9. Sequence of Deployment. Extension of UN deployment will transit successively from areas of current military conflict, to areas of UN military interest along Carana's international borders and terminate with deployments along the coast. This sequence is necessary as it will effectively deter the warring factions from resuming hostilities, reinforce the ceasefire, reduce military tensions, limit the possibilities of external military support to MPC and ICSC through the border areas at an early stage and create space for cantonment of forces once all belligerent strongholds are under UN deployments. In addition, this will facilitate the expansion of humanitarian operations, establish several disembarkation points for UN troops and logistics at an early stage and ensure that eventually all main ports remain under UN control. Dependent on a review of this ConOps through a Multi-disciplinary Technical Assessment Mission to Carana and also on resources available, deployments to cover border areas and the coast could be carried out simultaneously. In addition, flexibility will be exercised in order to ensure that deployment flows freely. Deployments to areas proving difficult will be shifted to

subsequent phases with other deployments from these phases being executed instead. Concurrent to Phase 2 of this ConOps, there will be a build-up of UNMO who will deploy to cover all the sectors. Their deployment will not follow the sequence of sector deployment.

10. Scheme of Manoeuvre. It is envisaged that UN participation will be in four phases. Phase 1 sees the UN Peacekeeping Force assume operational responsibility. Phase 2 is build-up and expansion and will see the early deployment of Sector HQs with advance battalions to all the three Sectors. This will be followed by a build-up of battalions to complete the Sector deployments and see UN presence in all major towns in Carana. Phase 3 is consolidation. With the UN deployed throughout Carana, this phase will see the implementation of provisions of the Kalari Treaty. Successful conclusion of phase 3 will see the UN Peacekeeping Force withdraw from Carana in phase 4.

a. Phase 1 – Assumption of Operational Responsibility in Carana. By M+90 (M is date of SCR)

(1) Aim. The aim of this phase is to assume operational responsibility by the UN Peacekeeping Force and establishing UN presence in Carana.

(2) Method.

(a) Deployment of Force HQ. The UN will commence security operations in Carana once the UN Force HQ has established presence and assumes operational responsibility. The Force Commander and a core group of military staff officers for key staff positions will deploy to Galasi by M+15 following pre-deployment training and necessary reconnaissance. These UN staff officers will lay ground for the establishment of the UNAC Force HQ.

(b) Deployment of Force Troops. Concurrent to establishment of the Force HQ, there will be a coordinated build-up of Force troops in order to afford the Force Commander latitude of action as soon as possible. Force troops required include lead elements of a light communications battalion and of a light logistics battalion, a reconnaissance company, HQ Company, a Level II medical unit and an aviation unit comprising attack and transport helicopters. These force troops will be deployed in theatre NLT M+90 Day.

(c) Expansion of Force HQ. Expansion of Force HQ will see the deployment of the main bodies of the light communications battalion and of the light logistics battalion, a Level III medical unit which will see the Level II unit relocate to HQ Sector 3 once it is established, deployment of an engineer roads construction company and one field engineering company. These troops will be deployed NLT M+45.

(d) Expansion of Sector 1. Expansion of HQ Sector 1 will see the deployment of an infantry battalion and an engineer field company NLT M+45. The deployment of an additional battalion in Galasi will reinforce the Galasi defence effort. In addition, this presence of UN troops in strength will act as deterrence to possible GoC breaches of the ceasefire.

(e) Preparations for Follow-on Sector HQ Deployments. In order to ensure speedy and well-coordinated follow-on deployments into Sectors 2 and 3 AORs, the two Sector HQs will need to arrive Carana NLT M+100. Early movement will facilitate briefings, reconnaissance and planning.

(f) UNMO. The Chief Military Observer with his principal staff officers should deploy to Carana NLT M+30. From the outset, UNMO will deploy to investigate, verify and report activities likely to derail the peace process and impair UN Operations.

(g) Effort. UN main effort will be to assume operational responsibility and ensure that the stability as soon as possible. Security efforts for Galasi in general and the Galasi Airport and Seaport in particular will be reinforced. Area domination patrols to accessible territory (areas in which UN troops will have freedom of movement without physically deploying there) outside Sector 1 will be vital for follow-on deployments. These patrols will open up the country and their success will determine the speed at which the subsequent phases will be executed. As a secondary effort, the UN will keep the warring parties actively engaged in matters related to the ceasefire, DDR and political reforms. This will be essential, as it will contribute significantly to confidence among the parties. This confidence will play a pivotal role during disarmament and demobilisation.

(3) End State. This first phase will be accomplished once the Force Commander has assumed full control of the operation and has reinforced security efforts in and around Galasi with HQ Sector 1 effectively dominating its area of responsibility.

(4) Tasks. In this phase, tasks for the UN Force will include:

- (a) Establishing Force HQ and HQ Sector 1, and securing Galasi, Galasi Airport and Seaport by physical deployment.
- (b) Providing security at key points and Government buildings in Galasi.

- (c) Controlling through static and mobile patrols, all entry points and routes into Sector 1 AOR.
- (d) Dominating and proving routes by patrols for follow-on deployments to accessible areas outside Sector 1 AOR.
- (e) Ensuring security and guaranteeing freedom of movement along the accessible lines of communication within the area of deployment.
- (f) Providing security to the Joint Commission for Ceasefire (JCC) in supervising compliance with the Kalari Treaty.
- (g) Within capabilities, protecting civilians under threat of physical violence in areas of deployment, including UN international staff and aid workers.
- (j) Supporting existing Interim Government efforts to canton, disarm and demobilise combatants.
- (k) UNMO will report all activities affecting the ceasefire, the Kalari Treaty and all other details deemed essential for the smooth conduct of UN Operations.

b. Phase 2 – Build-up and Expansion. This phase will be achieved NLT M+180.

(1) Aim. The aim of this phase is to deploy UN troops throughout Carana in order to ensure the implementation of the UN Mandate. This phase will see UN presence in all vital areas thereby facilitating the provision of humanitarian relief, providing security and creating a foundation for the implementation of the Kalari Treaty.

(2) Method.

a) Build-up and expansion will take place in a synchronized manner with care being taken to have a seamless transition between the movement of troops and resources from their disembarkation points and their subsequent deployment to designated areas. All efforts will be made to ensure that all available disembarkation points (Airports, airfields and ports) are used in order to hasten deployment. Concurrently, UN logistics build-up will occur to support extended operations.

b) The deployment will be achieved simultaneously. This phase will see the deployment of HQs Sectors 2 & 3 including sector units. (Refer to the map of the UNAC Force layout). These deployments will see the UN troops deploy to areas perceived to be a launch pads for MPC and ICSC incursions into Galasi and will lead to UN forces effectively deployed as an interposition force between GoC and ICSC/MPC forces. This deployment will also allow the UN troops deploy to ports (Maldosa, Cereni and Lora) that will be significant for follow-on UN deployments as well as for the expansion of humanitarian relief operations. In addition,

armed helicopters under command of the Force Commander, will extend UN influence to inaccessible areas or areas not yet accessed by UN troops. These patrols will be deterrence and confidence building measures.

c) Deploy one infantry battalion as Force Reserve in Galasi that will allow Force Commander options to respond to any unforeseen situation in the entire AOR.

(3) Effort. UN main effort will be to deploy rapidly in order ensure UN presence in all the Sector areas of responsibility at an early stage. Deployments to Gbarnga, Klay and Buchanan, will not only reduce military tensions, but will also see the UN open up lines of communications that are vital for the delivery of the much needed humanitarian relief. Harper is important to the timber trade. Control of this port will not only curb illegal timber trade and other shipments, but also afford the UN and other humanitarian agencies additional facilities to support their respective operations. With UN troops present in all the Sector areas, as a secondary effort at this stage, the UN will work actively with NCDDR in preparing plans for DDR. This will involve preparation of cantonment, disarmament and demobilisation procedures and identification of related infrastructure and technical support. Conclusion of this phase will see UN presence in all major military areas throughout Carana. This will create space for the commencement of cantonment, disarmament and demobilisation of the warring parties.

(4) Border Protection. The UN Force, using available air assets, will monitor the main crossing points along the Caraa borderline. Deployment to these areas will seek to ensure that external support to MPC and ICSC through this borderline is brought to a minimum. Such a move will logistically weaken MPC and ICSC and thus make them more responsive to the peace efforts.

(5) End State. This sphase will be accomplished once the identified remaining military objectives that conclude UN deployments to Carana are under UN domination, illegal timber trade and other illegal shipments through major ports are curtailed and stage is set for the commencement of DDR.

(6) Tasks. Tasks in this phase will include:

- i. Continuation of relevant Phase 1 task.
- ii. Securing Faron and Muka, and other key towns and villages by physical deployment (Refer to Map attached as Annex).
- iii. Keeping the warring factions apart in areas of deployment by establishing and manning lines of separation.
- iv. Establish one infantry battalion as Force Reserve in Galasi.

- v. Providing security at key points and Government buildings in all areas of deployment.
- vi. Ensuring security and freedom of movement along the main lines of communication by resorting to road opening and provision of armed escorts to vital convoys.
- vii. Conducting an information campaign aimed at highlighting DDR, the electoral process and human rights.
- viii. Dominating own areas of deployment through static and mobile patrols.
- ix. Conducting coordinated air and land patrols outside own areas of deployment - covering the whole of Carana - while using the element of surprise to effectively deter any hostile intent. Such patrols will include temporary deployments and snap checks in particularly identified locations.
- x. As deterrence to any attempts to derail the peace process, adopting an aggressive defensive posture.
- xi. Retaining adequate reserves at all levels to ensure flexible and sufficient reaction capability.
- xii. UNMO will continue to report all activities affecting the ceasefire, the Kalari Treaty and all other details deemed essential for the smooth conduct of UN Operations.
- xiii. Assist NCDDR in preparations for DDR.

c. Phase 3 – Consolidation. Not Before M+220, although limited activities could occur earlier than this in areas where sufficient peace support progress will have been made. Map at Annex illustrates full UN deployment for this phase.

(1) Aim. The aim of this phase will be to exploit the foundation that will have been created by the preceding phases and ensure that the achieved peace and stability holds and sets ground for the conclusion of provisions of the Kalari Treaty.

(2) Method. Once a build-up of forces has been achieved and the UN Force has extended its influence through physical deployment to key areas and has dominated its respective areas of responsibility, UN main effort will focus on supporting the Carana authorities to conclude the provisions of the Kalari Peace Agreement. As a way forward, DDR will be the main effort. Support, will also be rendered to the authorities in the area of security sector reform, especially Carana National Police restructuring in which UNPOL will play a key role. The UN Force will have to be actively involved in maintaining a close link with all stakeholders through contact group meetings and various confidence-building measures. An Information Campaign aimed at highlighting DDR, national reconciliation, reconstruction and elections will be essential for success in

this phase. In addition, the UN Force will have to support the Interim Government in holding free and fair national elections through the provision of security. Ensuring that a safe environment exists before and after the election will be essential. This will be paramount as through this, the elected Government will be in a position to extend its authority throughout Carana. Whilst undertaking all these peace support initiatives, the UN Force will ensure that it continues to hold its areas of responsibility in strength. At no one time should the peace and stability attained be put at risk.

(3) End State. This phase will be accomplished once democratic elections have been held, the elected Government is in full control of the whole of Carana and the post-election security situation is stable.

(4) Tasks. Tasks in this phase will include:

- (a) A continuation of relevant tasks from the preceding phases.
- (b) Assisting the GNR in the smooth implementation of the DDR programme by providing security at Cantonment Centres, DDR Reception Centres, securing Arms Storage Facilities and providing guard at Demobilisation Camps.
- (c) UNMO will support within capabilities the conclusion of disarmament and demobilisation by providing staff assistance to the DDR Reception Centres and assist with conducting documentation, disarmament and demobilisation of combatants.
- (d) UNMO will report all activities affecting the ceasefire, the Kalari Peace Agreement and all other details deemed essential for the smooth conduct of UN Operations.
- (e) Enhancing information operations in support of the peace process in general, and DDR and elections in particular.
- (f) Maintaining contact, at all levels, with the warring parties through contact group meetings.
- (g) Undertaking, where possible and within capabilities, projects aimed at winning the hearts and minds.
- (h) Assisting the Carana authorities, where required and possible, in security sector reforms in general and supporting and strengthening the Carana National Police in maintaining law and order in particular.
- (j) Provision of security for the holding of free and fair elections.
- (k) Maintenance of a stable security environment before and after the election.
- (l) Assisting the elected Government in the extension of its authority throughout Carana.
- (m) Planning for subsequent withdrawal of the UN Force from Carana.

d. Phase 4 - Withdrawal. Timelines for this phase are beyond the planning horizons of this concept paper.

(1) Aim. The aim of this phase will be the coordinated complete withdrawal of UN Forces from Carana once conditions for this have been achieved. (Elections have been held, security situation is stable and a credible security sector is in place).

(2) Method. Method of withdrawal is beyond the planning horizons of this concept paper. However, this phase will see the withdrawal of all UN Forces from Carana without jeopardizing the peace and stability that will have been attained while leaving the democratically elected Government of Carana in full control of all Carana territory.

(3) End State. There should be no UN military presence in Carana, except personnel tasked with mission liquidation duties.

(4) Tasks. These are beyond the planning horizons of this concept paper.

UNAC FORCE LAYOUT

11. Please see Annex to this paper.

TENTATIVE TIMELINE OF EVENTS

12. Please see Annex 'K'. (Not attached)

LOGISTICS.

14. COE and Sustainment. National contingents should be fully equipped. National contingent logistics will be simplified by concentrating their deployed forces into one area. A detailed Logistic Support Plan will be provided by DFS (to include air, maritime, medical, transport and sustainment details).

15. Special Equipment. There is a requirement to equip the UN Forces with specialised equipment. Surveillance and Target Acquisition (STA) equipment, eg Night Vision Goggles, Thermal Sights, Infra-red Vision Aids, Laser Range Finding and Designation Equipment, and GPS would significantly enhance the UN's all weather 24 hr capability.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

16. The Command relationships are set out in the "Directive to the Force Commander". The introduction of an appropriately reorganised framework of flexible Sectors will ease the command and control difficulties, as will the focussing of national communications equipment into single areas. A key element of command and control is liaison and special consideration should be given to what additional arrangements for liaison and communications equipment may be required to best co-ordinate the military effort with that of other UN agencies, NGOs and GoC.

Annexes:

- A. Map of Carana – Topography.
- B. Map of Carana – Roads and Lines of Communications.
- C. Map of Carana – Rebel held areas
- D. Map of Carana – Humanitarian Situation
- E. Map of Carana – Risk assessment
- F. Map of Carana - Force Layout.

TOPOGRAPHY



Sumora

Galasi

Katasi

Carana

Elevation



Cereni

Lora

Turen

Maldosa

Eres

Rimosa

ROADS AND LINES OF COMMUNICATION

Sumora

Galasi

Katasi

Carana

- Destroyed Road
- × Destroyed Object

Reference: Module 1/L, 7-Oct-07 slide 3 of 11

Rimosa


Eres

Maldosa

Turen

Lora

Cereni



Area with
limited
accessibility by
road

Sumora

Galasi

MPC

Carana



Rebel Controlled Areas

CDF Positions

CISC

Rimosa

Cereni


Lora

Turen


Maldosa


Eres

Katasi



HUMANITARIAN SITUATION






UN Country Team Locations

Sumora

RC
Galasi


Katasi

Carana



Opération
Intrépide

Rimosa



Exercise
FORCE HEADQUARTERS
UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN CARANA
(UNAC)



References:

- A. Security Council Resolution 1544 (20xx) [Not attached]
- B. Kalari Peace Agreement signed on 23 July 2006 (Not attached)
- C. Report of Secretary-General on situation in Carana (S/2006/195) [Not attached]
- D. UNAC Force Structure (**Annex A**)
- E. UNAC Force Deployment Plan (**Annex B**)

CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

1. ASSUMPTIONS

In preparing this Concept of Operations, the following assumptions were made:

- a. Parti Démocratique de Carana (PDC), Movement Patriotique de Carana (MPC) and Combattants Indépendants du Sud Carana (CISC) will respect the Karari Peace Agreement, observe a total cessation of hostilities and provide information on their forces. The PDC and Maheng Dar Party (MDP) will subsequently agree to join in the peace process.
- b. The Government of Carana will provide necessary security at ports and create soft landing conditions for the UNAC Force.
- c. The parties completed the Kalari Peace Agreement, which will lead to a newly elected Government.
- d. Carana's neighbours will respect its territorial integrity and sovereignty.
- e. The International Community will continue its support and commitment to the achievement of the desired end-state — lasting peace and stability in Carana.

2. CONSTRAINTS AND RESTRAINTS

- a. Constraints:** UNAC force capabilities will be expected to support the UN and national police efforts whenever requested to bring criminal and rogue elements in Carana under control.
- b. Restraints:** No UNAC military operations will be allowed in any of the countries adjacent to Carana.

3. MISSION

UNAC Force is to establish and maintain a safe and secure environment in Carana in accordance to United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1544, including all necessary actions, up to and including the use of deadly force, aimed at preventing or responding to threats of physical violence against civilians, within capabilities and areas of operations, and without prejudice to the responsibility of the host government to protect its civilians. The execution of this mission aims to provide all necessary support that will lead to the restoration of stability in Carana.

4. EXECUTION

a. COMMANDER'S INTENT

We will focus our efforts on creating safe and secure conditions throughout Carana. As a first priority in Carana, every possible effort must be made to bring the parties to the conflict under control.

To ensure the effective protection of civilians under threat of physical violence emanating from any armed group (Tier II), we need to effectively generate, and rehearse tactical plans under all phases of response. In addition, all military units should be ready to support and enable other protection partners in resolving their protection imperatives (Tier I&II)

Law and order issues will impact significantly on the process of establishing a safe environment for all. Limitations in the capability of the international police force in UNAC, dictate the need for us to coordinate closely with and vigorously support it in certain circumstances. Peaceful resolution of all military-related issues is our objective.

b. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

- (1) Phases:** UNAC military operations will be broken down into the following phases:

- (a) Phase 1 – Deployment**
- (b) Phase 2 – Establish secure environment**

Exercise

- (c) **Phase 3 – Maintain secure environment, protect civilians from physical violence and support other mission-mandated tasks**
 - (d) Phase 4 – Transition
 - (e) Phase 5 – Exit
- (2) **The UNAC force’s main effort will be to create, as quickly as possible, the conditions necessary for all our peacekeeping partners to conduct their tasks in a safe and secure environment. Force assets and efforts will be initially concentrated on the more difficult situation found in the NW of Carana and S where the CISC elements and organized criminal groups will be the biggest challenge.**
- (3) Humanitarian conditions in Carana, particularly for the displaced, are very poor. Within capabilities and security operational demands, UNAC forces are to assist agencies dealing with those in dire need. Close coordination with those agencies will be essential to ensure military assets are used judiciously and as a last resort.
- (4) Law and order in Carana is directly linked to the issue of security. Close cooperation with the UNAC and national police performing law-and-order tasks, will be essential, as will the need to conduct joint military/police operations.
- (6) Use of military force must be a last resort in all situations. Our objective remains to resolve all situations peacefully.
- (7) **End-State**
- (a) The end-state for UNAC force operations will be reached when we have done the following:
 - (i) Created a safe and secure environment in Carana — one conducive to a stable civil society,
 - (ii) Established the relationships necessary with all military factions to transition to the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) process, and
 - (iii) The subsequent development of a representative national military force in Carana.

c. TASKS

(1) Phase 1 – Deploy and establish essential liaison in Sectors

(2) Phase 2 – Tasks

(a) Sector 1

- (i) Establish a UN military presence throughout Sector
- (ii) Generate a safe and secure environment with an emphasis on Protection of Civilians
- (iii) Establish Military Coordination Committees at sector and unit level with MDP and PDC forces
- (iv) Assist UNAC police with law-and-order issues
- (v) Within capabilities, provide coordinated emergency assistance to humanitarian efforts
- (vi) Monitor major border-crossing areas for arms smuggling and paramilitary support activities.
- (vii) Within capabilities, provide technical assistance for humanitarian mine action activities
- (viii) Encourage respect for Human Rights in paramilitary elements

(b) Sector 2

- (i) Establish a UN military presence throughout Sector
- (ii) Generate a safe and secure environment with an emphasis on Protection of Civilians
- (iii) Establish Military Coordination Committees at sector and unit level with paramilitary forces
- (iv) Assist UNAC civilian police with law-and-order issues
- (v) Within capabilities, provide coordinated emergency assistance to humanitarian efforts
- (vi) Monitor major border-crossing areas for paramilitary support activities

Exercise

- (vii) Within capabilities, provide technical assistance for humanitarian mine action activities
- (viii) Encourage respect for Human Rights in paramilitary elements

(c) Sector 3

- (i) Establish a UN military presence throughout Sector
- (ii) Generate a safe and secure environment with an emphasis on Protection of Civilians
- (iii) Monitor activities of factional forces
- (iv) Establish Military Coordination Committees at sector and unit level with factional paramilitary forces
- (v) Assist UNAC civilian police with law-and-order issues
- (vi) Within capabilities, provide coordinated emergency assistance to humanitarian efforts
- (vii) Monitor major border-crossing areas for arms smuggling and paramilitary support activities
- (viii) Be prepared to act on orders to detach up to two Infantry Companies (Coys) Operational Control (OPCON) to UNAC Force HQ
- (ix) Within capabilities, provide technical assistance for humanitarian mine action activities
- (x) Encourage respect for Human Rights in paramilitary elements
- (i) Establish a UN military presence throughout Sector
- (ii) Generate a safe and secure environment
- (iii) Establish Military Coordination Committees at sector and unit level with paramilitary forces
- (iv) Within capabilities, provide coordinated emergency assistance to humanitarian efforts
- (v) Within capabilities, provide technical assistance for humanitarian mine action activities
- (vi) Encourage respect for Human Rights in paramilitary elements

Exercise

(e) Force Reserve

- (i) Be ready to reinforce Sectors on order
- (ii) Establish liaison with the UN police and local police for crowd control tasks

(f) Military Observers

As directed by Sector Senior Military Observers, assigned United Nations Military Observers (UNMO) teams are to assist, as appropriate, in establishing continuous observation of key areas for potential clashes between the former warring factions, and a military presence throughout their sectors.

(3) Phase 3

(a) All Elements

- (i) Maintain appropriate presence and security operations with an emphasis on Civilians at risk
- (ii) Be prepared to, when directed,
 - Support the DDR process
 - Conduct disarmament operations
 - Provide a secure environment for the election process and provide protection in cooperation with national security forces to designated person or groups
 - Coordinate closely with UNAC Police to support DDR and Elections
 - Support and advise the training and establishment of the Carana Armed Force (CDF), as needed

(4) Phase 4 – Phased handover of security responsibilities to Carana Armed Forces (CDF and National Police)


(5) Phase 5 – Redeploy to home stations

5. COMMAND AND CONTROL

Exercise


- a. UNAC Force and Sector HQs – See UNAC Force Structure (Annex A)
- b. Sectors and Boundaries – See UNAC Force Deployment (Annex B)

Annex A



UNAC Force Deployment Plan

Details of UNMO teams' deployment plan are not shown.



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Force HQ
Galasi

xx xxx 20xx

**UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION CARANA (UNAC) OPERATIONAL
ORDER (OPORD) 01/ 20xx**

References:

- A. Kalari Peace Agreement dated 19 May 20xx
- B. UNSCR 1544

1. SITUATION

a. **General Political and Strategic Situation.** On 19 May 2006, after years of violent conflict in Carana a ceasefire agreement called the Kalari Peace Agreement (KPA), Ref A, was signed between the country's government and the main rebel forces – the Movement Patriotique de Carana (MPC) in the West and the Combattants Indépendants de Sud Carana (CISC) in the South West.

- i. The KPA calls for a ceasefire, disengagement of forces, a mechanism to verify and control the ceasefire, the formation of a Government of National Reconciliation (GNR), and commits to elections within a year, the disarmament of rebel forces and the integration of some of their soldiers into a restructured armed forces. The GNR replaces the largely one party, one ethnicity repressive governance of President Ogavo whose actions contributed to the start of the conflict.
- ii. The KPA was brokered by the 8th Continent Regional Coalition (CRC) who provided an Observer Mission called the CRC Assistance Mission to Carana (CRCAC) to observe the implementation of the KPA. Additionally the GNR invited a French force, Op INTRÉPIDE, to deploy to SW Carana on the Rimosa border to counter Islamist extremism.
- iii. UNSCR 2300 (2015), Ref B, authorizes an integrated mission, the UN Assistance Mission to Carana (UNAC) to assist the GNR to implement the provisions of the KPA. CRCAC military personnel will be incorporated within UNAC but not Op INTRÉPIDE.
- iv. The ceasefire has held although the forces have not significantly withdrawn leaving the potential for a swift return to conflict.

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- v. The GNR is struggling with its responsibilities and there are security vacuums. Even when in power the previous government struggled to provide law and order outside the rebel held areas. Police presence is very low, they are under-resourced and were heavily politicized under the previous regime. So there are areas still controlled by the regime, areas controlled by MPC, areas loosely controlled but not administered by the CISC and about a third of the country ungoverned. Internal security functions such as immigration, customs and port authority have ceased to exist. Crime rates are high, organized and transnational crime is evident in the narcotics and diamond trade. The suburbs of the capital, Galasi, are under the control of youth gangs, in Akkabar there is open conflict between miners and the police and in Leppko province there is radicalized and sectarian violence involving elements of the CISC but also uncontrolled armed groups (not party to the KPA).
- vi. There is a significant humanitarian situation. There are an estimated 100,000 refugees and 1000,000 IDPs. Most IDPs have fled to the coastal cities and are now clustered in makeshift camps and shantytowns with inadequate health and sanitation. Almost no medical infrastructure exists in the rural areas.
- vii. The countries surrounding Carana are also part of the CRC. Relations between Carana and Sumora are traditionally good, however those with Katasi have been strained as Carana accused Katasi of supporting the rebel MPC. Relations with Rimosa, which has its own civil war, are also strained with one of the rebel groups, the Lassi Liberation Front, having loose links with the Combatants.

b. General Military Situation and Assessment of Armed Groups.

- i. Following the signing of the KPA, the MPC, CISC and the government Carana Defence Forces (CDF) have generally remained where they were, unwilling to concede any gains made. While no violations of the ceasefire have been reported, the close proximity of opposing forces poses a significant risk that will increase the longer it is allowed to continue. Less predictable is the increasing presence of Islamist extremists operating out of Leppko Province, particularly in the mountainous South West adjacent to the Rimosa border; as well as the activities of radicalized non-signatory armed groups operating in Hanno and Leppko who are responsible for a continued level of violence against civilians.
- ii. Movement Patriotique de Carana (MPC). The MPC is a well-structured and efficient military opposition that has achieved some local success over the CDF and has appeared better prepared than many of its CDF counterparts. It has gained increasing support from the local population in its area of influence. It currently has no aspirations beyond the western provinces. The official HQ of MPC is in Alur and following the ceasefire, this has increased in importance and become a basic administrative centre

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for the region as the MPC take over government and basic administrative functions providing some basic needs and security for the population in the West. However, the MPC has no coherent political strategy other than the removal of the Ogavo government (now achieved) and better representation for non-Caran ethnicities although it is now developing a political platform on which to campaign in the elections. The MPC has a total strength of around 10,000 fighters, since the ceasefire 5000 have returned home but are on short notice to return to their formations if required.

Assessment:

Most Likely: The MPC leadership continue to support the KPA, this will include disarming their combatants in expectation of the inclusion of some of their fighters in the reformed CDF. Continue representation in the GNR and participate in the elections

Most Dangerous: MPA lose faith in the KPA and a multi-ethnic government and return to political and military confrontation with the Government with aspirations for the separation of the western provinces from Carana.

Response to UNAC Deployment: MPC will remain supportive as long as UNAC is seen as impartial and effective

- iii. Combattants Indépéndants de Sud Carana (CISC). The CISC is an unstructured formation of rebels of diverse backgrounds. Unlike the MPC, the CISC has not tried to establish administrative functions or exercise control in the region except by force. The total strength is estimated to be around 3,000 fighters. It has a weak command and control structure and discipline and internal cohesion is low, as is the standard of training. However, an influx of experienced, extremist, foreign fighters upped the tempo and quality of CISC operations before the treaty. The movement has been successful in recruiting young men from the local population, due to its military successes and reaction against the brutality of the government's counter-insurgency campaign, which indiscriminately targeted Tatsi in the Southern region. The CISC also regularly abducts civilians to bolster its ranks. Its area of influence is confined to Leppko Province, with less influence on the Leppko coast.

Assessment:

Most Likely: Within the limitations of its organisational capability, CISC will support the KPA and accept GNR governance and the expansion of law and order into Leppko Province. Due to a record of CISC atrocities, few combatants are likely to be accepted into the CDF, those rejected may return to the field in splinter groups. These will continue violence against non-Tatsi, non-Muslim populations.

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Most Dangerous: Spurred on the foreign radical Islamist fighters and external support the CISC becomes more radical and more capable. CISC resumes operations against Carana forces in order to allow it the freedom of manoeuvre to conduct its own operations against Caran and other minorities in order to secure the primacy of Tatsi, Muslim authority.

Response to UNAC Deployment: CISC are unlikely to welcome UNACs presence, particularly as they are already under the vigilance of Op INTRÉPIDE in the SW of Leppko Province. Some elements are likely to be hostile to UNAC and force protection will need to be increased accordingly.

- iv. Other Groups. There are a number of relatively small armed groups / armed criminal gangs who have taken advantage of the security vacuum and operate in their local areas. They were not part of the KPA process and are likely to continue their activities until UN / Carana Government security deployments prevent them. In the coal mining area of Akkabar, the miners are in open conflict with the national police and have also attacked government institutions. Although not an armed group, the miners have links to criminal cartels and are a major destabilising influence in Hanno Province.
- c. Government Security Forces. These security forces, while national, have developed over nearly 30 years of government by President Ogavo into Caran dominated entities and no longer representative of the country. The KPA has identified their reform as an essential part of peace.
 - i. Carana Defence Forces (CDF). The CDF is the state security apparatus and has a total strength of approximately 10,000 men (9,000 Army, 800 Air Force, 200 Navy). Prior to the KPA, the chiefs of the service reported direct to the president. The navy has a small number of coastal and river patrol boats. The air force, equipped with a squadron of armed helicopters, transport helicopters and a few, un-operational light bombers, has a limited strike capacity. The main military force in the CDF is the army, which is equipped with light tanks, reconnaissance vehicles, Armored Personnel Carriers, Artillery Guns and Mortars, Missile Launchers and Anti-Aircraft Guns. Some of this equipment is very old and much is in considerable need of repair. The CDF have maintained their positions after the ceasefire with four battalions opposite the MPC in the West and three facing the CISC in the South-West. The battalions in the South West have a history of perpetuating acts of politicide, ethnic cleansing and other human rights violations.

Assessment: The CDF are too Caran dominated to be considered an impartial force. As the national force, they are not required to disarm within the terms of the KPA, but they need to be closely monitored,

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particularly in Leppko Province. The reduction in the numbers of soldiers currently in the CDF, to make way for the entry of MPC and CISC combatants and the reform of the CDF to become a multi-ethnic force is likely to create its own tensions and will need to be planned carefully with the Carana government.

- ii. **Presidential Guard.** The Presidential Guard is approximately 1500 strong, based in Galasi and fiercely loyal to President Ogavo. The President has been in hiding since April 2015, accompanied by elements of the Guard.

Assessment: The Presidential Guard elements remaining in Galasi are not part of the CDF and are potential spoilers – particularly if President Ogavo, indicted by the ICC and the GNR, reappears.

- iii. **Carana National Police (CNP).** The Police consists of the CNP who are largely located in population centres and report to the Ministry of Interior, and the Gendarmerie in the rural areas who report to the Ministry of Defence and also have responsibility for border security – both have been traditionally seen as enforcers of Ogavo's repressive regime and as such disliked and not trusted by much of the population. There are 10,000 CNP and Gendarmerie, although numbers have decreased through desertions and assassinations by anti-Ogavo elements. The Police are ill-trained, poorly paid, ill equipped and have bad morale.

Assessment: The CNP and Gendarmerie are very unlikely to be accepted into MPC or CISC controlled areas and a very different police force will be required if it is to be acceptable throughout Carana.

d. Friendly and Cooperating Organisations.

- i. **CRC and CRCAC.** The CRC will continue to support the KPA and endeavour to restrain any unsupportive actions by Katasi and Rimosi. The CRCAC military members will be subsumed into UNAC provided they meet the UN standards.
- ii. **Op INTREPIDE.** The French mission terminates after 6 months. UNAC will need to establish liaison and coordination in preparation for assuming control of their Area of Responsibility.
- iii. **UN Country Team (UNCT).** UNDP lead the country team, which is based in Galasi. The UNCT are represented in most parts of Carana but due to the security situation they are unable to access some areas to conduct a needs assessment and then provide support.
- iv. **NGOs and ICRC.** A total of twelve international and eighteen local NGOs operate throughout Carana, providing services in various sectors including food, health, water, hygiene, sanitation, refugee and IDP issues, children's issues and women's issues. Additionally, the International Committee of

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the Red Cross and Red Crescent Society (ICRC), are present in Galasi, Corma and Alur.

- e. United Nations Direction. The objective of the United Nations is to contribute to the creation of an environment conducive to national reconciliation, lasting peace and stability in a united Carana, where human rights are respected, the protection of all citizens is assured and in which internally displaced persons and refugees can return home in safety and dignity; and to contribute to the protection of civilians at risk. The tasks for UNAC are to:

- Support the implementation of the KPA
- Protect civilians including humanitarians and human rights defenders
- Support humanitarian and Human Rights assistance
- Support Security reform
- Support the implementation of the peace process including elections

Mission end-state is a democratically elected government with restructured, ethnically representative and accountable security forces sufficiently able to protect all its civilians and where human rights are respected.

2. MISSION

UNAC Force is to establish and maintain a safe and secure environment in Carana in accordance to United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1544, including all necessary actions, up to and including the use of deadly force, aimed at preventing or responding to threats of physical violence against civilians, within capabilities and areas of operations, and without prejudice to the responsibility of the host government to protect its civilians. The execution of this mission aims to provide all necessary support that will lead to the restoration of stability in Carana.

3. EXECUTION


a. COMMANDER'S INTENT

We will focus our efforts on creating safe and secure conditions throughout Carana. As a first priority in Carana, every possible effort must be made to bring the parties to the conflict under control.


To ensure the effective protection of civilians under threat of physical violence emanating from any armed group (Tier II), we need to effectively generate, and rehearse tactical plans under all phases of response. In addition, all military units should be ready to support and enable other protection partners in resolving their protection imperatives (Tier I&II)


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Law and order issues will impact significantly on the process of establishing a safe environment for all. Limitations in the capability of the international police force in UNAC, dictate the need for us to coordinate closely with and vigorously support it in certain circumstances. Peaceful resolution of all military-related issues is our objective.









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Sector 2 HQ
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UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION CARANA (UNAC)

SECTOR 2 HQ

WARNING ORDER (WARNO) 01/ 20xx

References:

- A. UNSCR 1544
- B. OPOD FHQ
- C. Deployment Maps

1. SITUATION

a. **General Political and Strategic Situation.** On 19 May 2006, after years of violent conflict in Carana a ceasefire agreement called the Kalari Peace Agreement (KPA), Ref A, was signed between the country's government and the main rebel forces – the Movement Patriotique de Carana (MPC) in the West and the Combattants Indépendants de Sud Carana (CISC) in the South West.

- i. The KPA calls for a ceasefire, disengagement of forces, a mechanism to verify and control the ceasefire, the formation of a Government of National Reconciliation (GNR), and commits to elections within a year, the disarmament of rebel forces and the integration of some of their soldiers into a restructured armed forces. The GNR replaces the largely one party, one ethnicity repressive governance of President Ogavo whose actions contributed to the start of the conflict.
- ii. The KPA was brokered by the 8th Continent Regional Coalition (CRC) who provided an Observer Mission called the CRC Assistance Mission to Carana (CRCAC) to observe the implementation of the KPA. Additionally the GNR invited a French force, Op INTRÉPIDE, to deploy to SW Carana on the Rimosá border to counter Islamist extremism.
- iii. UNSCR 2300 (2015), Ref B, authorizes an integrated mission, the UN Assistance Mission to Carana (UNAC) to assist the GNR to implement the provisions of the KPA. CRCAC military personnel will be incorporated within UNAC but not Op INTRÉPIDE.

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- iv. The ceasefire has held although the forces have not significantly withdrawn leaving the potential for a swift return to conflict.
- v. The GNR is struggling with its responsibilities and there are security vacuums. Even when in power the previous government struggled to provide law and order outside the rebel held areas. Police presence is very low, they are under-resourced and were heavily politicized under the previous regime. So there are areas still controlled by the regime, areas controlled by MPC, areas loosely controlled but not administered by the CISC and about a third of the country ungoverned. Internal security functions such as immigration, customs and port authority have ceased to exist. Crime rates are high, organized and transnational crime is evident in the narcotics and diamond trade. The suburbs of the capital, Galasi, are under the control of youth gangs, in Akkabar there is open conflict between miners and the police and in Leppko province there is radicalized and sectarian violence involving elements of the CISC but also uncontrolled armed groups (not party to the KPA).
- vi. There is a significant humanitarian situation. There are an estimated 100,000 refugees and 1000,000 IDPs. Most IDPs have fled to the coastal cities and are now clustered in makeshift camps and shantytowns with inadequate health and sanitation. Almost no medical infrastructure exists in the rural areas.
- vii. The countries surrounding Carana are also part of the CRC. Relations between Carana and Sumora are traditionally good, however those with Katasi have been strained as Carana accused Katasi of supporting the rebel MPC. Relations with Rimosa, which has its own civil war, are also strained with one of the rebel groups, the Lassi Liberation Front, having loose links with the Combatants.

b. General Military Situation and Assessment of Armed Groups.

- i. Following the signing of the KPA, the MPC, CISC and the government Carana Defence Forces (CDF) have generally remained where they were, unwilling to concede any gains made. While no violations of the ceasefire have been reported, the close proximity of opposing forces poses a significant risk that will increase the longer it is allowed to continue. Less predictable is the increasing presence of Islamist extremists operating out of Leppko Province, particularly in the mountainous South West adjacent to the Rimosa border; as well as the activities of radicalized non-signatory armed groups operating in Hanno and Leppko who are responsible for a continued level of violence against civilians.
- ii. Movement Patriotique de Carana (MPC). The MPC is a well-structured and efficient military opposition that has achieved some local success over the CDF and has appeared better prepared than many of its CDF

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counterparts. It has gained increasing support from the local population in its area of influence. It currently has no aspirations beyond the western provinces. The official HQ of MPC is in Alur and following the ceasefire, this has increased in importance and become a basic administrative centre for the region as the MPC take over government and basic administrative functions providing some basic needs and security for the population in the West. However, the MPC has no coherent political strategy other than the removal of the Ogavo government (now achieved) and better representation for non-Caran ethnicities although it is now developing a political platform on which to campaign in the elections. The MPC has a total strength of around 10,000 fighters, since the ceasefire 5000 have returned home but are on short notice to return to their formations if required.

Assessment:

Most Likely: The MPC leadership continue to support the KPA, this will include disarming their combatants in expectation of the inclusion of some of their fighters in the reformed CDF. Continue representation in the GNR and participate in the elections

Most Dangerous: MPA lose faith in the KPA and a multi-ethnic government and return to political and military confrontation with the Government with aspirations for the separation of the western provinces from Carana.

Response to UNAC Deployment: MPC will remain supportive as long as UNAC is seen as impartial and effective

- iii. Combattants Indépendants de Sud Carana (CISC). The CISC is an unstructured formation of rebels of diverse backgrounds. Unlike the MPC, the CISC has not tried to establish administrative functions or exercise control in the region except by force. The total strength is estimated to be around 3,000 fighters. It has a weak command and control structure and discipline and internal cohesion is low, as is the standard of training. However, an influx of experienced, extremist, foreign fighters upped the tempo and quality of CISC operations before the treaty. The movement has been successful in recruiting young men from the local population, due to its military successes and reaction against the brutality of the government's counter-insurgency campaign, which indiscriminately targeted Tatsis in the Southern region. The CISC also regularly abducts civilians to bolster its ranks. Its area of influence is confined to Leppko Province, with less influence on the Leppko coast.

Assessment:

Most Likely: Within the limitations of its organisational capability, CISC will support the KPA and accept GNR governance and the expansion of

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law and order into Leppko Province. Due to a record of CISC atrocities, few combatants are likely to be accepted into the CDF, those rejected may return to the field in splinter groups. These will continue violence against non-Tatsi, non-Muslim populations.

Most Dangerous: Spurred on the foreign radical Islamist fighters and external support the CISC becomes more radical and more capable. CISC resumes operations against Carana forces in order to allow it the freedom of manoeuvre to conduct its own operations against Caran and other minorities in order to secure the primacy of Tatsi, Muslim authority.

Response to UNAC Deployment: CISC are unlikely to welcome UNACs presence, particularly as they are already under the vigilance of Op INTRÉPIDE in the SW of Leppko Province. Some elements are likely to be hostile to UNAC and force protection will need to be increased accordingly.

- iv. Other Groups. There are a number of relatively small armed groups / armed criminal gangs who have taken advantage of the security vacuum and operate in their local areas. They were not part of the KPA process and are likely to continue their activities until UN / Carana Government security deployments prevent them. In the coal mining area of Akkabar, the miners are in open conflict with the national police and have also attacked government institutions. Although not an armed group, the miners have links to criminal cartels are a major destabilising influence in Hanno Province.
- c. Government Security Forces. These security forces, while national, have developed over nearly 30 years of government by President Ogavo into Caran dominated entities and no longer representative of the country. The KPA has identified their reform as an essential part of peace.
 - i. Carana Defence Forces (CDF). The CDF is the state security apparatus and has a total strength of approximately 10,000 men (9,000 Army, 800 Air Force, 200 Navy). Prior to the KPA, the chiefs of the service reported direct to the president. The navy has a small number of coastal and river patrol boats. The air force, equipped with a squadron of armed helicopters, transport helicopters and a few, un-operational light bombers, has a limited strike capacity. The main military force in the CDF is the army, which equipped with light tanks, reconnaissance vehicles, Armored Personnel Carriers, Artillery Guns and Mortars, Missile Launchers and Anti-Aircraft Guns. Some of this equipment is very old and much is in considerable need of repair. The CDF have maintained their positions after the ceasefire with four battalions opposite the MPC in the West and three facing the CISC in the South-West. The battalions in the South West have a history of perpetuating acts of politicide, ethnic cleansing and other human rights violations.

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Assessment: The CDF are too Carana dominated to be considered an impartial force. As the national force, they are not required to disarm within the terms of the KPA, but they need be to be closely monitored, particularly in Leppko Province. The reduction in the numbers of soldiers currently in the CDF, to make way for the entry of MPC and CISC combatants and the reform of the CDF to become a multi-ethnic force is likely to create its own tensions and will need to be planned carefully with the Carana government.

- ii. Presidential Guard. The Presidential Guard is approximately 1500 strong, based in Galasi and fiercely loyal to President Ogavo. The President has been in hiding since April 2015, accompanied by elements of the Guard.

Assessment: The Presidential Guard elements remaining in Galasi are not part of the CDF and are potential spoilers – particularly if President Ogavo, indicted by the ICC and the GNR, reappears.

- iii. Carana National Police (CNP). The Police consists of the CNP who are largely located in population centres and report to the Ministry of Interior, and the Gendarmerie in the rural areas who report to the Ministry of Defence and also have responsibility for border security – both have been traditionally seen as enforcers of Ogavo's repressive regime and as such disliked and not trusted by much of the population. There are 10,000 CNP and Gendarmerie, although numbers have decreased through desertions and assassinations by anti-Ogavo elements. The Police are ill-trained, poorly paid, ill equipped and have bad morale.

Assessment: The CNP and Gendarmerie are very unlikely to be accepted into MPC or CISC controlled areas and a very different police force will be required if it is to be acceptable throughout Carana.

d. Friendly and Cooperating Organisations.

- i. CRC and CRCAC. The CRC will continue to support the KPA and endeavour to restrain any unsupportive actions by Katasi and Rimosa. The CRCAC military members will be subsumed into UNAC provided they meet the UN standards.
- ii. Op INTRÉPIDE. The French mission terminates after 6 months. UNAC will need to establish liaison and coordination in preparation for assuming control of their Area of Responsibility.
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- Support the implementation of the peace process including elections

Mission end-state is a democratically elected government with restructured, ethnically representative and accountable security forces sufficiently able to protect all its civilians and where human rights are respected.

2. MISSION

UNAC Sector 2 units are to establish and maintain a safe and secure environment in their AORs in accordance to UNSCR 1544, including all necessary actions, up to and including the use of deadly force, aimed at preventing or responding to threats of physical violence against civilians, within capabilities and areas of operations, and without prejudice to the responsibility of the host government to protect its civilians. The execution of this mission aims to provide all necessary support that will lead to the restoration of stability in Carana.

3. EXECUTION

a. COMMANDER'S INTENT

To ensure the effective protection of civilians under threat of physical violence emanating from any armed group (Tier II), we need to effectively generate, and rehearse tactical plans under all phases of response. In addition, all military units should be ready to support and enable other protection partners in resolving their protection imperatives (Tier I&II).

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Battalion Commanders to conduct a Mission Analysis for your AOR and brief SHQ NLT (D+5) on the risk analysis of the threats identified in your AORs, possible COAs in all phases of response and additional resources you may need to execute your operations.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

TBD after unit's Mission Analysis (MDMP) are reviewed by SHQ.